Is China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress a Threat to Ethnic Minorities and Diaspora Abroad?

JPTi Legal Review of the Law in Light of International Human Rights Standards

27 June 2026

Executive Summary

Concerns and grievances raised by Uyghur diaspora organisations, affected communities and human rights advocates, including those reflected in the framing “China’s New Law on ‘Ethnic Unity’ - A Threat to Human Rights and Cultural Survival,” deserve careful legal attention. These concerns relate to the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress of the People’s Republic of China and its possible implications for minority languages, cultural identity, religious life, children, education, family transmission of heritage, freedom of expression, diaspora communities, extradition and refugee protection.

The law should be analysed as a law of the People’s Republic of China adopted by the National People’s Congress, while also taking into account China’s constitutional and political framework. Formal legal attribution and political-context analysis should not be collapsed.

The strongest legal finding is not that the law, before implementation, already proves genocide, cultural destruction or completed assimilation. The stronger and more legally precise finding is that several provisions create a risk of rights-infringing implementation unless they are interpreted narrowly, applied with procedural safeguards, and read together with China’s own constitutional and statutory protections for ethnic equality, regional ethnic autonomy, minority languages, cultural heritage and non-discrimination.

International human rights law does not prohibit a State from promoting social cohesion, a common civic identity, a common language, national unity or interethnic harmony. It does, however, prohibit policies that make participation in public life conditional on the weakening, abandonment or securitisation of minority language, culture, religion, family memory, historical identity or peaceful advocacy. The decisive legal question is therefore whether “ethnic unity” is implemented as rights-protective integration or as pressure toward involuntary assimilation.

The main human rights concerns arise from the breadth of concepts such as “ethnic unity,” “ethnic division,” “correct” views of history and religion, national security risks in the ethnic field, online content that “destroys ethnic unity,” and extraterritorial responsibility for persons or organisations outside the PRC. These concepts may legitimately apply to incitement, discrimination, violence, terrorism or genuinely coercive separatist conduct. They become problematic if used against minority-language education, religious autonomy, cultural preservation, peaceful criticism, academic research, diaspora advocacy or engagement with international human rights mechanisms.

The review therefore recommends a forward-looking and implementation-focused approach. The PRC should be encouraged to clarify that the law will not be used to suppress minority languages, family transmission of cultural identity, religious autonomy, lawful minority advocacy, academic work, journalism or peaceful diaspora expression. Host States should also ensure that extradition, mutual legal assistance and immigration decisions are not used in a manner that exposes minority advocates to persecution, torture, arbitrary detention, unfair trial or punishment for protected expression.

A holistic legal review is important because similar concepts recur across legal systems: national unity, official language, integration, secularism, public order, counter-extremism, national security, child protection, sanctions, media regulation and protection against foreign interference. These concepts may pursue legitimate aims. They become problematic when they burden identity itself rather than concrete unlawful conduct. This is why the PRC law should be examined together with clear safeguards, and why other States should also be examined when their policies affect minority and diaspora communities in comparable ways.

The purpose is not to equate all factual situations. The purpose is to maintain a universal legal standard: unity may be pursued, but identity must not be erased; a common language may be promoted, but minority languages must not be displaced; national security may be protected, but ethnicity, language, religion or diaspora status must not become a suspect category. This standard applies to China and to its critics alike.

1. Scope and Method of Review

This review examines the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress from the perspective of international human rights law. It also considers relevant PRC legislation that may assist a rights-protective interpretation of the new law. The purpose is not to substitute political characterisation for legal analysis. The purpose is to identify where the law requires safeguards to comply with minority rights, non-discrimination, education rights, cultural rights, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression, protection of children, non-refoulement and protection against transnational repression.

The review is prospective because the law enters into force on 1 July 2026. A prospective review should identify legal risks, interpretive safeguards and implementation standards. It should not present legal conclusions that depend on future enforcement as if they had already been established. Allegations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing or cultural destruction require specific legal elements and evidence. They should not be replaced by rhetorical assumptions, even where serious risks exist.

The review also applies a universal standard. The fact that Western or Western-aligned States have adopted assimilationist, official-language, national-security, secularism-based or diaspora-affecting measures does not excuse any violation in China. It does, however, reinforce the need for consistency. Human rights analysis is credible only when the same principles are applied to all States: unity may be pursued, but identity must not be erased; a common language may be promoted, but minority languages must not be displaced; security may be protected, but identity itself must not become a suspect category.

2. Domestic Attribution and Legal Character of the Law

The law was formally adopted by the Fourth Session of the 14th National People’s Congress on 12 March 2026 and, under Article 65, enters into force on 1 July 2026. Its formal legal character is therefore that of a law of the People’s Republic of China adopted by the competent national legislative organ. Describing it simply as a “CCP law” is imprecise if the purpose is legal attribution. A more accurate formulation is that it is a PRC law adopted by the National People’s Congress and reflecting current State policy on ethnic unity, national integration and social cohesion within China’s constitutional-political framework.

This distinction is not merely semantic. In international legal analysis, acts are attributed to the State through its organs and legal framework. Political context may be relevant, especially in a system in which the leadership role of the Communist Party of China is constitutionally recognised, but formal legislative attribution should remain accurate. The same method should be applied to all States, including executive orders, statutes and administrative measures adopted in other national systems.

3. Applicable International Human Rights Standards

The PRC has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That distinction should be acknowledged. The ICCPR does not bind China in the same way as it binds States parties. Nevertheless, the Covenant remains an important universal benchmark, and Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires a signatory State to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty pending a clear decision not to become a party. In addition, many of the principles reflected in the ICCPR are also present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other treaties binding on China.

China is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. These instruments are directly relevant to ethnic equality, non-discrimination, education, cultural participation, children’s rights, protection against torture, non-refoulement and protection from persecution.

Article 27 of the ICCPR provides a useful legal benchmark for minority rights. It states that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with others, to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language. The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that minority rights may require positive measures and that protection of identity must be meaningful, not merely formal. Although China is not a party to the ICCPR, this standard remains useful for evaluating whether an ethnic-unity framework preserves minority identity in practice.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child is particularly important because the law addresses education, minors and family guidance. The best interests of the child, the child’s right to education, the child’s right to culture, language and religion, and the rights of minority children must be considered together. A child-centred analysis does not justify severing children from their cultural and linguistic communities. It requires that education prepare children for equal participation while preserving family, culture, language and identity.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is also central. It permits and, in certain circumstances, requires measures against racial discrimination, ethnic hatred and incitement. However, it does not permit States to suppress peaceful identity-based expression, minority advocacy or cultural autonomy under the label of unity. Measures against hatred must remain distinct from measures against legitimate criticism, minority self-identification or peaceful claims of cultural rights.

4. Legal Distinction Between Integration and Assimilation

International human rights law permits integration when it expands participation, equality, education, employment, mobility, civic belonging and access to public institutions while allowing persons belonging to minorities to remain linguistically, culturally, religiously and historically continuous. Integration becomes assimilation when participation is made conditional, directly or indirectly, on weakening or abandoning minority language, religion, culture, historical memory, family identity, community continuity or peaceful collective self-understanding.

The distinction is decisive for the assessment of the PRC law. Terms such as unity, harmony, common identity and integration are not unlawful in themselves. The legal risk arises when those terms become enforceable standards against which minority narratives, religious practice, cultural education, language use, family transmission of identity or diaspora advocacy are judged as threats. The law must therefore be implemented in a manner that protects difference within common citizenship, rather than treating difference as evidence of disloyalty.

This distinction is also important because assimilation is not a problem confined to China or to non-Western political systems. Western and Western-aligned States have their own histories and present practices in which national unity, public order, official language, secularism, child protection, citizenship, national security, sanctions, emergency powers or foreign-policy alignment have affected minority languages, religious practices, cultural continuity, political participation and diaspora life. These examples do not excuse any rights-infringing implementation of the PRC law. They demonstrate why the legal standard must be universal, human-centred and non-selective.

The United States provides one of the clearest historical examples. Federal Indian boarding school policies used education as a tool of identity alteration, including the separation of Indigenous children from family and community environments, the discouragement or prohibition of Indigenous languages and religious practices, renaming, hair-cutting and military-style discipline. These policies were presented in the language of civilisation, education and national integration, but their practical function was assimilation. The legal lesson is directly relevant to any modern law that places children, schools and family education at the centre of State-led identity formation.

The contemporary United States also illustrates that identity-related harm may arise not only through schools or language policy, but through emergency governance, sanctions, extraterritorial enforcement and national-security framing. Domestic emergency-powers frameworks may permit prolonged and renewable executive measures under broad national-security standards without adequately incorporating stricter international requirements of necessity, proportionality, temporality, non-discrimination, independent judicial review and effective remedies.

This point is relevant to the present analysis because emergency powers and national-security measures may affect due process, property, family life, movement, migration, expression, association, judicial protection, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance risks, transnational repression and extraterritorial accountability. These measures are not necessarily assimilationist in the classical linguistic or educational sense, but they show how powerful States may use security, emergency, sanctions and foreign-policy language to restrict rights, stigmatise dissent, weaken remedies and burden diaspora or politically exposed communities.

The United States example is therefore relevant in two ways. First, it shows historically how education and child policy can be used for direct assimilation. Second, it shows currently how national security and emergency powers can create a broader architecture of coercive control, including financial exclusion, travel restrictions, reputational harm, sanctions without remedy, criminal exposure, surveillance, extradition pressure and transnational repression. This reinforces the core human rights principle that States should not be allowed to transform integration, security, public order, emergency or foreign-policy tools into mechanisms that suppress identity, dissent, minority advocacy or diaspora participation.

Canada and Australia show the same problem through residential schools, forced relocation, forced or coerced child removal, and other child-related systems that weakened Indigenous family continuity, languages and cultural transmission. Formal repudiation of past assimilation does not remove the continuing relevance of these examples. Human rights analysis must remain attentive to whether education, child protection, welfare, adoption or institutional care systems still produce cultural disconnection, even when the language used by the State is protective or benevolent.

In Europe, assimilation may appear in more administrative or legally refined forms. Estonia and Latvia have legitimate historical concerns arising from Soviet domination, deportations, demographic engineering and Russification. They also have legitimate interests in protecting their State languages, constitutional orders and public institutions. However, those interests do not extinguish the rights of Russian-speaking and other minority children, parents, religious communities, political representatives and civil society actors. The legal question is not whether Estonia or Latvia may protect the Estonian or Latvian language. They may. The legal question is whether language protection, education reform and national-security framing are implemented in a manner that preserves minority identity, or whether they cross the line into involuntary linguistic, cultural, religious or political assimilation.

Estonia illustrates this risk. The concerns are not limited to schools. They also include measures affecting a major Orthodox religious community, including the non-renewal of the residence permit of its senior hierarch, resulting in his effective expulsion from Estonia, disruption of religious leadership, legislative amendments restricting doctrinal, administrative, financial or spiritual ties with foreign religious authorities, and the subsequent judicial validation of those amendments despite serious concerns of non-compliance with international human rights standards. The invocation of national security in relation to ecclesiastical matters is particularly sensitive. Where legislative and judicial measures affect doctrine, governance, clergy presence, religious leadership or community continuity, the issue is no longer ordinary integration into a civic framework. It becomes a question of whether minority religious and cultural identity is being treated as a security problem.

The same concerns arise where national-security provisions are applied to non-violent conduct, closed proceedings, restricted access to evidence, or the narrowing of space for political opposition and minority advocacy. In the education field, Estonia’s transition to Estonian-language education is particularly relevant. It does not amount to a general ban on speaking Russian, but it phases out Russian and other minority languages as languages of instruction in public education. The transition began in kindergartens and selected grades in 2024 and is intended to move the education system toward Estonian-language instruction across levels by 2030, with further deadlines for upper secondary education. When language reform is combined with language requirements in employment, public life and access to services, it may deepen structural exclusion unless accompanied by adequate safeguards, support measures and meaningful consultation with affected communities.

Latvia presents a closely related example. Latvia has adopted reforms requiring the transition of minority education institutions, including Russian-language and bilingual institutions, toward instruction in Latvian. These reforms require pre-school and school institutions, including bilingual and minority-language institutions, to transition to instruction exclusively in Latvian. Latvia has also moved to phase out Russian as a second foreign language option in schools from the 2026/2027 school year, replacing it with EU, EEA or other approved foreign languages. This is not a general prohibition on Russian in private life, but it significantly reduces Russian-language education and the formal institutional space for Russian within the public education system.

These reforms may pursue legitimate aims, including protection of the State language, social cohesion and equal access to public institutions. However, they become human-rights sensitive where they weaken minority-language continuity, reduce cultural transmission, burden educational outcomes, or treat Russian-speaking communities as security risks rather than rights-holders. The concern extends beyond education, because language, national security, political participation, public employment and minority advocacy may become intertwined. This does not mean that all security concerns are artificial. It means that security and language policy must not become instruments through which minority identity, peaceful advocacy or political participation are made legally suspect.

These Baltic examples are relevant to the assessment of China’s ethnic-unity framework because they show that assimilation is not always expressed through overt prohibitions on identity. It may also occur through education reform, language requirements, administrative supervision, criminal-law framing, national-security assessments, public-service access rules, religious-affiliation measures, judicial validation of restrictive legislation and political stigma. The universal human rights question is therefore the same in Europe and in China: does the State promote a common civic language and shared public life while preserving minority continuity, or does it make access to education, employment, public institutions, religious life and political participation conditional on weakening minority language, culture, religion, memory or affiliation?

Ukraine presents a particularly sensitive case because it is defending itself against Russian invasion and has a legitimate interest in protecting the Ukrainian language, sovereignty, constitutional order and national survival. At the same time, war does not erase the rights of persons belonging to minorities or religious communities. Russian-speaking, Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, Greek and other minority communities cannot be treated merely as obstacles to State consolidation or as proxies for a foreign power. Even in wartime, measures affecting minority-language education, cultural life, religious identity and public participation must remain lawful, necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory.

Ukraine’s language policy is therefore directly relevant to the distinction between integration and assimilation. The promotion of Ukrainian as the State language is legitimate, especially in light of past Russification and the present war. However, language protection becomes human-rights sensitive when it reduces the practical space for minority languages in education, public life, media, services, cultural activity, political participation or community identity. Ukrainian law does not appear to impose a general prohibition on speaking Russian, and the State Language Law expressly excludes private communication and religious rites from its scope. The concern is therefore not a blanket legal ban on Russian, but the cumulative effect of State-language, education, media and minority-language measures that reduce the public and institutional space for Russian and treat it differently from other minority languages.

The legal question is therefore not whether Ukraine may require Ukrainian in public administration, education, official communication or national institutions. It may. The legal question is whether such requirements leave sufficient space for minority-language education, cultural expression, private and public communication, community life, media access, political speech and equal participation. A State may promote a common language as a tool of civic integration, but it should not use language policy to weaken minority continuity or to make access to public life conditional on the abandonment of linguistic identity.

The situation of religious communities with historical, canonical or spiritual links to religious structures in the aggressor State adds a further religious and cultural dimension. Ukraine’s 2024 legislation on the protection of the constitutional order in the sphere of religious organisations addresses religious organisations alleged to be linked to the Moscow Patriarchate or to other religious structures connected with the aggressor State. This concern cannot be dismissed as artificial in the context of Russia’s invasion and the public alignment of the Moscow Patriarchate’s leadership with the war. However, the implementation of such measures must not treat believers, clergy, parishes or religious communities as security threats merely because of canonical, historical, linguistic, cultural or spiritual ties.

The legal issue is therefore not whether Ukraine may protect itself from genuine foreign interference, collaboration, incitement or security threats. It may. The legal issue is whether measures directed at foreign influence are implemented with sufficient safeguards to protect freedom of religion or belief, church autonomy, property, clergy status, parish life, religious education, minority-language use and community continuity. Where language, religious affiliation, worship tradition or ecclesiastical history are treated as evidence of disloyalty without concrete unlawful conduct, the measure risks moving from national-security protection into linguistic, religious and cultural assimilation or exclusion. A State may defend its constitutional order, but it must not make participation in national life conditional on abandoning minority language, religious identity, historical memory or spiritual affiliation.

France illustrates a different model. Republican universalism, secularism and indivisible citizenship may protect equality by resisting formal communal separation, but they can also make minority and Indigenous identities less visible and burden religious, linguistic and cultural expression. Public face-covering restrictions demonstrate this tension: State concepts such as secularism, public order, republican values or “living together” may be invoked as cohesion-based justifications, but they still require human-centred scrutiny where religious identity, dignity and personal autonomy are affected. Contemporary French overseas territories also show that questions of unity, citizenship and indivisibility cannot be separated from colonial history, self-determination and demographic or cultural continuity. In New Caledonia, the legacy of settlement, land dispossession and demographic change remains connected to present disputes over the electoral body, political representation and the protection of Indigenous Kanak identity. In French Polynesia / Māʻohi Nui, the issue is less one of current large-scale settler replacement than of continued non-self-governing status, the legacy of nuclear testing, recognition of Polynesian languages, control over natural resources and the preservation of Indigenous cultural and political identity. These examples do not make contemporary France identical to the PRC, but they show that indivisible citizenship and republican equality may coexist with unresolved questions of Indigenous continuity, self-determination, language, land, resources and effective remedies.

Denmark and Greenland provide another contemporary example. Greenland / Kalaallit Nunaat is not merely a historical colonial issue, because questions of Indigenous self-determination, language, resources, family integrity and strategic control remain present. Denmark’s Self-Government Act recognises the people of Greenland as a people under international law with the right to self-determination and provides a legal route toward independence if the people of Greenland so decide. At the same time, Greenland remains within the Kingdom of Denmark, and important areas such as foreign policy and security continue to involve Danish authority. The contemporary relevance is therefore not only demographic settlement, but the continuing relationship between self-government, Indigenous identity, external strategic interests, resource control and full political self-determination. Recent scrutiny of coercive contraception imposed on Greenlandic women and girls also shows how colonial policies may affect bodily autonomy, family continuity and Indigenous demographic life long after formal colonial categories have been replaced by self-government arrangements. This example reinforces the same universal point: integration, citizenship or constitutional unity cannot justify policies that weaken Indigenous continuity, family integrity, language, land, resources or the effective exercise of self-determination.

The Netherlands and Bonaire provide another contemporary example. Bonaire is not merely a historical colonial question. Since 2010, it has been a special municipality of the Netherlands, but concerns remain regarding self-determination, political status, local identity, migration-driven demographic change, housing pressure, social inequality and unequal protection compared with the European Netherlands. Official statistics show that recent population growth in the Caribbean Netherlands, especially on Bonaire, has been driven mainly by migration. In a small island society, such demographic change may affect housing, services, political representation, cultural continuity and the practical ability of the local population to shape its own future. The issue should therefore not be framed simplistically as migration itself being unlawful. The legal concern is whether constitutional integration, administrative status and economic development are accompanied by effective safeguards for local identity, equal treatment, social rights, land and housing access, climate protection, participation and self-determination. Recent climate litigation concerning Bonaire also illustrates how overseas territories may be treated unequally when compared with the European part of the State. This example reinforces the broader point that unity, citizenship and administrative integration must not obscure the rights of small island communities to equality, participation, cultural continuity, environmental protection and meaningful control over their political and social development.

Recent Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also illustrate the risk that measures directed at a foreign State may spill over into cultural or linguistic exclusion of diaspora communities. Sanctions, public-broadcasting bans, sporting restrictions, academic disengagement, cultural cancellations and reputational pressure may have legitimate security or foreign-policy objectives when directed at State institutions, propaganda networks or persons directly linked to invasion. They become human-rights sensitive when language, cultural participation, professional life, academic exchange or advocacy for dialogue are treated as signs of disloyalty without evidence of concrete unlawful conduct.

The same legal principle should therefore apply in all directions. A minority community should not be treated as a proxy for a foreign State. A language should not be treated as inherently hostile. Cultural or religious continuity should not be treated as disloyalty. Advocacy for minority rights, dialogue, cultural preservation or restoration of relations should not be equated with separatism, extremism, propaganda or national-security threat unless there is evidence of concrete unlawful conduct. Emergency powers, sanctions, national-security designations and extraterritorial enforcement should not be used to bypass legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, judicial oversight and effective remedies.

This universal standard strengthens, rather than weakens, the legal assessment of the PRC law. It permits JPTi to reject selective, premature or politically motivated accusations against China while still insisting that any implementation of the PRC law must preserve minority languages, cultures, religions, education, family transmission of identity, peaceful advocacy and diaspora rights. It also requires Western and Western-aligned States to examine their own histories and present practices with the same level of legal scrutiny they demand from China.

5. Main International Human Rights Findings

5.1 Equality and Non-Discrimination

Article 5 of the law affirms equality before the law, equality of all ethnic groups, and the prohibition of discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group. This provision is a positive element and should be used as an interpretive anchor. However, formal equality is not sufficient if implementation produces unequal effects on minority languages, religious communities, cultural heritage, education or family transmission of identity. International human rights law requires both non-discrimination in law and non-discrimination in practical effect.

The practical test is whether persons belonging to minorities can preserve and develop their identity without suffering disadvantage in education, employment, public services, religious life, online expression, family life or engagement with public authorities. If the law is applied to require uniformity of language, ideology or cultural expression, Article 5 would be undermined by the law’s own implementation.

5.2 Minority Rights, Culture and Identity

Articles 1, 3, 4, 6 and related provisions frame the law around ethnic unity, a strong sense of the community of the Chinese nation, common prosperity, cohesion and interaction among ethnic groups. These objectives may be legitimate. They become human-rights sensitive if “commonality” is implemented in a way that reduces the social space for minority languages, cultures, religious traditions, local histories or distinct collective memories.

The relevant international standard is not whether the State may promote a national identity. It may. The standard is whether the State also protects the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language in community with others. A rights-compliant ethnic-unity policy should therefore include active protection of minority cultural institutions, local traditions, historical sites, oral literature, religious heritage, artistic expression, and intergenerational transmission of identity.

5.3 Language and Education

Article 15 is central. It promotes the national common spoken and written language, provides that schools and other educational institutions use the national common language and script as the basic language of education and teaching, promotes Mandarin learning among preschool children, and requires students completing compulsory education to basically master the national common language. At the same time, Article 15 states that the State respects and protects the learning and use of minority languages and scripts.

The promotion of Mandarin is not in itself contrary to international human rights law. A common language may support equal access to higher education, public administration, employment and national participation. The legal concern is displacement. If Mandarin promotion leads to the practical reduction, symbolic treatment or gradual elimination of minority-language education, then the policy risks moving from integration to assimilation. Education should therefore be bilingual or otherwise structured in a way that enables children to master the common language while retaining meaningful literacy, cultural knowledge and family continuity in their minority language.

Articles 16 to 18 reinforce this concern because they require the concept of forging a strong sense of the community of the Chinese nation to be integrated into education, teaching materials, social practice, thematic education and online education. Nationally unified teaching materials may serve administrative consistency, but they must not erase minority histories, languages, religions, traditions or locally rooted identities. The rights of minority children require educational content that reflects both equal citizenship and cultural continuity.

5.4 Children, Family Life and Parental Guidance

Article 20 is one of the most sensitive provisions because it enters the family sphere. It requires the concept of forging a strong sense of the community of the Chinese nation to be integrated into family education and family tradition building. It also requires parents or guardians to educate and guide minors to love the Communist Party of China, the motherland, the people and the Chinese nation, and not to instil concepts that are not conducive to ethnic unity and progress.

This provision may raise concerns regarding parental rights, children’s rights, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and family transmission of minority language, culture, religion and historical memory. The family is often the primary place where minority identity is transmitted. A rights-compliant interpretation should therefore make clear that peaceful transmission of minority memory, religious teaching, language, historical experience and cultural identity cannot be treated as contrary to ethnic unity merely because it is distinct from the official narrative.

The best interests of the child should not be equated with ideological conformity. Children belonging to minorities should be prepared for full participation in society, but they should also remain connected to their family, community, language, culture, religion and identity. The law requires safeguards to prevent State concepts of unity from overriding the child’s minority identity and the family’s role in preserving that identity.

5.5 Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief

Articles 11 to 14 refer to identification with the motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party of China and socialism with Chinese characteristics, and to “correct” views of the State, history, ethnicity, culture and religion. Article 46 requires religious groups, religious schools and places of religious activity to carry out publicity and education on forging a strong sense of the community of the Chinese nation, to adhere to the direction of sinicisation of religions, and to guide religion to adapt to socialist society.

These provisions may raise serious concerns if implemented in a manner that interferes with the internal autonomy of religious communities, doctrine, clergy formation, religious education, worship, religious identity or self-understanding. International human rights law protects not only public manifestations of religion, but also the internal freedom to hold beliefs without coercion. The State may regulate conduct to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others, but it should not prescribe religious doctrine or require religious communities to reshape their identity in order to conform to political or ideological objectives.

A rights-compliant interpretation of Article 46 should distinguish patriotic civic conduct from State control over belief. Religious communities may be expected to respect the law and refrain from incitement or violence. They should not be compelled to alter doctrine, religious education, liturgy, leadership, internal governance or community memory in order to satisfy an ideological standard of unity.

5.6 Freedom of Expression, Academic Freedom and Online Speech

Article 10 opposes acts that use ethnicity, religion or human rights as pretexts to smear, contain, suppress, infiltrate or undermine the PRC. Article 31 prohibits production or dissemination of information containing ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination or other content that destroys ethnic unity and progress, and requires network operators to stop transmission, remove information, preserve records and report to competent authorities. Articles 53 and 54 create additional mechanisms concerning disputes, complaints and reporting.

Preventing ethnic hatred, discrimination, incitement and violence is legitimate and may be required by international human rights law. The legal risk lies in the breadth of phrases such as “destroying ethnic unity and progress” and the characterisation of human rights engagement as a possible pretext for hostility. Peaceful criticism, research, journalism, testimony, religious expression, minority-rights reporting, cultural preservation and engagement with UN mechanisms must not be treated as threats merely because they are uncomfortable to the State or because they challenge official narratives.

The law therefore requires clear implementing guidance. Restrictions should be limited to expression that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, violence, terrorism, coercive separatism or other concrete unlawful conduct. Vague harm to unity should not be sufficient. The distinction between prohibited incitement and protected advocacy must be preserved.

5.7 National Security and the Risk of Securitising Identity

Article 52 applies the overall national security concept to ethnic affairs and requires mechanisms for reporting, identifying, assessing, warning against and handling major risks and hidden dangers in the ethnic field. National security is a legitimate State interest. However, minority identity, minority language, religious affiliation, cultural memory or peaceful advocacy should not be treated as security risks in themselves.

International human rights law requires restrictions to be lawful, necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory. Even where national security is invoked, the State must identify concrete conduct and concrete harm. Measures should target actual threats, such as violence, incitement, coercion, terrorism, espionage or unlawful foreign interference. They should not convert an entire ethnic, religious or linguistic community into a suspect category.

5.8 Enforcement, Complaints and Legal Responsibility

Articles 54 and 57 to 62 establish complaint, reporting and responsibility mechanisms. These provisions may strengthen accountability where they address discrimination, hatred, violence, terrorism or genuine public disorder. They may also create a chilling effect if broadly interpreted against minority grievances, religious concerns, cultural advocacy, academic debate, peaceful association or international human rights engagement.

The safeguards should include legal certainty, narrow definitions, access to counsel, reasons for decisions, independent review, protection against malicious reporting, and remedies for individuals or communities affected by abusive enforcement. Public interest litigation should not be used to punish protected expression or minority identity under the language of State or social public interests.

5.9 Extraterritoriality, Diaspora Communities and Transnational Repression

Article 63 is the clearest provision with potential extraterritorial implications. It provides that organisations and individuals outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China who commit acts directed at the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division shall be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law. This makes it legally accurate to raise concerns about possible effects on diaspora communities, refugees, asylum seekers, journalists, scholars, religious figures and civil society advocates abroad.

The human rights concern is not that States may never regulate genuinely criminal conduct with cross-border effects. The concern is whether peaceful expression, cultural preservation, religious activity, academic research, journalism or minority-rights advocacy abroad could be characterised as “ethnic division” or “destroying ethnic unity and progress.” If applied in that way, Article 63 could contribute to transnational repression by creating legal vulnerability for persons who are outside China but remain connected to communities inside China.

China should therefore clarify that Article 63 is not intended to target peaceful diaspora expression, cultural preservation, religious activity, academic work, journalism, advocacy before international bodies or lawful criticism of State policy. Host States should also treat any requests for extradition, mutual legal assistance, evidence-sharing or immigration enforcement with heightened caution where the underlying conduct appears to be protected expression, minority advocacy or political opinion.

5.10 Non-Refoulement, Extradition and Refugee Protection

The law’s possible extraterritorial application also engages non-refoulement and refugee protection. A person should not be extradited, removed or otherwise transferred where there are substantial grounds to believe that he or she would face persecution, torture, arbitrary detention, unfair trial, punishment for protected expression, or prosecution on political, ethnic, religious or cultural grounds. The Convention against Torture prohibits return where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The refugee framework protects persons with a well-founded fear of persecution.

Host States should not accept broad labels such as separatism, extremism, ethnic division or threat to unity without individualised assessment. At the same time, asylum and extradition frameworks should remain evidence-based. The correct standard is not automatic acceptance or automatic rejection of claims concerning China. It is case-specific examination of risk, fair trial guarantees, treatment in detention, the nature of the alleged conduct, and whether the person is being pursued for protected expression, identity or peaceful advocacy.

6. PRC Domestic Legal Safeguards Relevant to Interpretation

The new law should be read together with existing PRC constitutional and statutory protections. This domestic framework does not remove all human rights concerns, but it provides important interpretive material for a rights-protective implementation of the law.

Article 4 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides that all ethnic groups are equal, that the State protects the lawful rights and interests of ethnic minorities, that discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group are prohibited, and that all ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own traditions and customs. The same constitutional provision also recognises regional autonomy in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities.

Articles 116, 119, 121 and 122 of the Constitution are also relevant. They concern the capacity of autonomous areas to adopt autonomous regulations and local-specific regulations, manage educational, scientific, cultural, health and sports undertakings, protect cultural heritage, promote ethnic cultures, use local commonly used spoken and written languages, and receive State assistance. These provisions should be used to ensure that ethnic unity does not hollow out regional ethnic autonomy.

The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy provides further domestic safeguards. It includes guarantees concerning the use and development of minority languages, the preservation or reform of traditions and customs, religious belief, educational and cultural autonomy, and the protection and development of ethnic cultural traditions. These provisions support the conclusion that the new ethnic-unity law should not be implemented as a tool of cultural homogenisation.

The Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language promotes Putonghua and standard Chinese characters, but it also recognises that all ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own languages and scripts, with the use of minority languages and scripts governed by the Constitution, the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and other relevant laws. This is directly relevant to Article 15 of the new law.

The Education Law provides that the State assists the development of education in regions inhabited by minority ethnic groups and recognises that, in schools and other educational institutions where students of a minority ethnic group constitute the majority, the language used by that ethnic group or commonly used by local ethnic groups may be used for instruction. This is an important domestic basis for arguing that Mandarin promotion should not displace meaningful minority-language education.

The Law on Intangible Cultural Heritage, the Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics and the Law on the Protection of Minors are also relevant. They support preservation of traditional cultural expressions, oral literature and the language carrying it, cultural sites and materials, non-discrimination against minors, and the best interests of the child. These instruments should guide interpretation of the new law in relation to culture, education and children.

Taken together, these PRC legal instruments support a rights-protective reading of the new law. The proper interpretive question is whether implementation of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress will comply with China’s own constitutional and legislative protections, as well as with applicable international human rights obligations and standards.

7. Provisions Requiring Particular Safeguards

The following table is included to make the legal findings easier to read. It does not replace the analysis above. It identifies the provisions that require the clearest safeguards from an international human rights perspective.

Provision	Human rights issue	Required safeguard
Articles 1, 3, 4 and 6	Broad objectives of unity, commonality, integration and national cohesion.	Interpret these objectives as integration with protection of minority identity, not as cultural uniformity.
Article 5	Equality and non-discrimination.	Apply equality substantively, including to language, education, religion, culture and access to public life.
Article 10	Possible treatment of human rights advocacy, religious freedom work or diaspora engagement as hostile interference.	Protect peaceful advocacy, academic work, reporting and engagement with UN mechanisms.
Articles 11 to 14	Ideological and historical conformity, including “correct” views of history, culture and religion.	Preserve freedom of thought, academic freedom, religious self-understanding and minority historical memory.
Articles 15 to 18	Mandarin promotion, national teaching materials and education policy.	Ensure meaningful minority-language education, bilingual access and genuine representation of minority histories and cultures.
Article 20	Family education, parental guidance and children’s identity.	Ensure that family transmission of minority language, religion, culture and historical memory is protected.
Article 31	Online content control.	Limit restrictions to incitement, discrimination, violence or concrete unlawful conduct, not peaceful criticism or advocacy.
Article 46	Religious sinicisation and adaptation to socialist society.	Protect religious autonomy, doctrine, worship, clergy formation, religious education and internal governance.
Article 52	National security in the ethnic field.	Require concrete risk and concrete unlawful conduct; avoid securitising identity itself.
Articles 54 and 57 to 62	Reporting, public interest litigation and legal responsibility.	Ensure legal certainty, procedural safeguards, independent review and protection against malicious or abusive reporting.
Article 63	Extraterritorial responsibility and diaspora impact.	Exclude peaceful diaspora expression, cultural preservation, journalism, scholarship, religious activity and human rights advocacy from the scope of liability.

8. Social Credit System, Legal Certainty and the Need for Codification

The Social Credit System is relevant because both it and the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress concern governance, compliance, trust, public order, social cohesion and the relationship between citizens, enterprises, public authorities and the State. It should not be treated simplistically as a “surveillance score” or as inherently unlawful. Properly regulated, it may support transparency, regulatory consistency, anti-corruption, equal treatment, market integrity, protection of SMEs and trust in public administration.

At present, the Social Credit System has developed largely through policy documents, action plans, administrative measures, local pilots, sectoral rules and data-sharing mechanisms. The State Council’s 2014 Planning Outline covered government integrity, business integrity, social integrity and judicial credibility. In 2022, the National Development and Reform Commission and the People’s Bank of China published a draft Law on the Construction of the Social Credit System for public consultation. In 2024, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the 2024-2025 Social Credit System Construction Action Plan. These instruments show that the system is operational and policy-driven, but also why a clear national law is necessary.

Converting the Social Credit System from policy-based governance into legislation is directly connected to the rule of law. Policy documents may guide administration, but they do not provide the same level of legal certainty, public scrutiny, rights protection, judicial review or uniform national standards as a statute. A national law should define the scope of the system, categories of information collected, authorities allowed to process information, conditions for listing persons or enterprises as seriously untrustworthy, permissible legal consequences and available remedies.

This is particularly important in the context of the ethnic-unity law, which contains broad concepts such as ethnic unity, ethnic division, integration, public order, national security, online information control, reporting mechanisms and legal responsibility. If future implementation were connected directly or indirectly with credit mechanisms, minority persons, religious communities, cultural associations, schools, enterprises, diaspora-linked organisations or online actors could be affected by administrative classifications or reputational consequences. Any such use should be governed by law, not vague policy, local discretion or informal political assessment.

The draft Social Credit law is relevant because it addresses government integrity, business integrity, social integrity and judicial credibility, as well as credit information processing, credit regulation, incentives for trustworthiness and legal consequences for untrustworthiness. It also includes provisions on lawful rights and interests, information security, State secrets, commercial secrets, personal privacy, rights to know and query credit information, objections, correction or deletion of inaccurate or unlawful information, credit repair, administrative reconsideration and litigation.

Codification could therefore discipline administrative control through law. Adverse credit consequences should be imposed only on the basis of law, for clearly defined conduct, by competent authorities and through transparent procedures, including notice, reasons, access to evidence, proportionality assessment, time limits, correction mechanisms, credit repair, independent review and effective remedy.

The law should prohibit discriminatory use of credit systems on grounds of ethnicity, religion, language, political opinion, cultural identity, family background, diaspora ties or peaceful advocacy. This matters for Uyghur-owned SMEs and other minority entrepreneurs, who should be treated as rights-holders and lawful economic actors, not merely as objects of scrutiny, compliance or security assessment. A legally regulated system could protect them from arbitrary exclusion, corruption, discriminatory scrutiny, inconsistent local enforcement and reputational punishment without evidence.

Before any adverse credit-related action is taken against an SME or individual entrepreneur, the affected person or enterprise should receive notice, reasons, access to relevant information and a meaningful opportunity to correct alleged conduct where correction is possible. Legal liability should arise only in cases of non-compliance with clearly defined legal obligations, and must be lawful, legitimate, necessary, proportionate, time-limited where applicable, and subject to administrative, judicial and citizen-complaint review.

The key point is therefore not to reject the Social Credit System as such. The stronger legal point is that any governance mechanism capable of affecting rights, reputation, mobility, business activity, access to services or public participation must rest on a clear legislative foundation. Codification would help separate legitimate credit regulation from political labelling, administrative arbitrariness or social punishment.

9. Institutional Safeguards, Domestic Remedies, NHRIs, NMIRFs and Effective Follow-up

The review and remedy architecture should distinguish clearly between domestic remedies, independent human rights scrutiny and governmental implementation follow-up. These functions are complementary, but not interchangeable. Domestic administrative and judicial remedies remain the primary channels for individuals, communities and enterprises affected by unlawful or disproportionate measures. NHRIs, where established in conformity with the Paris Principles, provide independent monitoring, assessment, reporting and public accountability. NMIRFs provide governmental coordination for reporting, implementation and follow-up to recommendations from treaty bodies, the Universal Periodic Review and Special Procedures.

The Paris Principles remain the correct benchmark for determining whether a body qualifies as an NHRI in the international sense. Measured against that benchmark, China should not be described as having a GANHRI-accredited NHRI. This is a precise institutional point, not a judgment that Chinese domestic institutions are ineffective, non-credible or irrelevant. The absence of GANHRI accreditation means that Chinese institutions should not be presented internationally as Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs unless they meet the relevant standards. It does not mean that domestic administrative, judicial, citizen-complaint, ethnic-affairs, supervisory or anti-corruption remedies should be ignored.

NMIRFs must also be addressed separately. They are not NHRIs and do not replace independent scrutiny or individual remedies. Their role is governmental coordination: preparing State reports, distributing international recommendations among ministries, tracking implementation, coordinating responses to treaty bodies, the UPR and Special Procedures, and translating international standards into domestic policy and administrative action. International concerns brought to the Government through UN mechanisms should therefore be channelled, where possible, into both independent assessment and governmental follow-up, while affected persons retain access to ordinary domestic remedies.

In the PRC context, the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration should be treated as an important citizen-complaints and petitioning body, not as a Paris Principles NHRI. It may provide an accessible domestic channel for citizens, communities and SMEs affected by unfair listings, reputational harm, denial of services, administrative arbitrariness, discriminatory treatment or failure by local authorities to correct mistakes, but it should not be equated with an independent NHRI.

The National Ethnic Affairs Commission is directly relevant in a sector-specific way. Its role in coordinating ethnic work, guiding and supervising ethnic laws and policies, safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of people of all ethnic groups, and supporting minority culture and language-related work gives it an important function in cases involving ethnic identity, minority-owned SMEs, minority-language use, cultural expression or religiously connected ethnic identity. It remains, however, a sectoral administrative body, not a Paris Principles NHRI.

The National Commission of Supervision should be mentioned only in a specific and secondary way. It is not a human rights body, ombudsman or NHRI. Its relevance arises where adverse measures result from corruption, abuse of authority, retaliation, favouritism, local protectionism or other misconduct by public officials. Its proper role is public-official accountability, not general human rights protection.

Any Social Credit law should preserve and clarify all relevant domestic remedies. Affected persons, communities and enterprises should have access to citizen-complaint channels, administrative reconsideration, administrative litigation before the people’s courts, sectoral ethnic-affairs review where minority identity is implicated, and supervisory remedies where public officials abuse power. These domestic remedies should operate alongside, not be replaced by, any NHRI or NMIRF-type mechanism.

The PRC should also clarify which institution or inter-agency mechanism is responsible for implementation, reporting and follow-up on international human rights recommendations concerning ethnic unity, Social Credit governance, minority rights and anti-discrimination. If China has or establishes an NMIRF or NMIRF-type mechanism, it should coordinate follow-up across relevant ministries and agencies, including ethnic affairs, education, culture, public security, justice, civil affairs, market regulation, data governance and local authorities. Recommendations from treaty bodies, the UPR and Special Procedures should be translated into administrative guidance, implementation plans, timelines, indicators and public reporting where appropriate.

The absence of a GANHRI-accredited NHRI should not create an institutional vacuum. Nor should accreditation be treated as the beginning and end of civic protection. GANHRI accreditation remains important, but protection of rights-holders, access to remedies and civic defence must not depend solely on formal accreditation status. Where no GANHRI-accredited NHRI exists, the practical question is which domestic institutions can receive complaints, review administrative action, address abuses, coordinate implementation and provide remedies.

Accordingly, the PRC should ensure a clear allocation of functions: administrative remedy where administrative action is challenged; judicial protection where rights are affected; citizen complaints where people seek correction from public authorities; ethnic-affairs review where minority identity is implicated; supervision where officials abuse power; independent NHRI review if such an institution is established; and NMIRF-type coordination where international recommendations require domestic implementation.

JPTi may therefore recommend that the PRC accelerate adoption of a comprehensive national Social Credit law with safeguards for legality, transparency, personal-information protection, non-discrimination, proportionality, notice, reasons, correction, credit repair, citizen complaints, administrative reconsideration, judicial review, implementation follow-up and effective remedies. In the specific context of ethnic unity, peaceful cultural expression, minority-language use, religious practice, academic research, family transmission of identity, diaspora contact and lawful minority-rights advocacy should not be treated as “untrustworthy” conduct unless linked to concrete unlawful acts established by law and reviewed through fair procedures.

10. Preservation of Ethnic, Cultural and Linguistic Identity: Uzbekistan as a Comparative Example

A credible assessment of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress should not treat national unity and minority identity as mutually exclusive. International human rights law permits States to promote civic cohesion, a common language of public life, national belonging and interethnic harmony. The legal question is whether these objectives are pursued through inclusion, participation and preservation of identity, or through pressure to dilute, replace or abandon minority language, culture, religion, family memory and community continuity.

Uzbekistan provides a useful comparative example because its constitutional and legislative framework links national unity with respect for the languages, customs and traditions of all nationalities and ethnic groups. Article 4 of the Constitution establishes Uzbek as the State language, while requiring respectful treatment of the languages, customs and traditions of all nationalities and ethnic groups and the creation of conditions for their development. Article 8 defines the people of Uzbekistan as all citizens regardless of nationality, and Article 19 guarantees equality before the law without discrimination, including on grounds of nationality, language and religion.

Uzbekistan’s Law on the State Language follows the same logic by allowing preschool education in the languages of national groups in places of compact residence and recognising the right freely to choose the language of instruction. Together with the Law on Public Associations, which allows republican, regional, district, city, settlement and rural public associations, this framework shows that promotion of a State language can coexist with lawful minority-language education, cultural transmission and visible community institutions.

The Uyghur example is particularly relevant. Publicly available information identifies a Uyghur National Cultural Center in Tashkent, as well as Uyghur cultural activity at regional and local levels, including Andijan. This demonstrates that Uyghur cultural identity can be given lawful and visible institutional expression within a sovereign State, without being treated as separatism, extremism or disloyalty. The point is not that Uzbekistan’s model is perfect or should be copied mechanically, but that national unity can coexist with recognised community-based cultural structures at republican, regional and local levels.

This comparison is important because China does not appear to have a publicly visible, community-based “Association of Uyghurs” comparable to Uzbekistan’s Uyghur Cultural Centre model. Instead, China appears to rely mainly on State-led ethnic autonomy, cultural administration, intangible-cultural-heritage protection, educational institutions and regulated social-organisation channels. This is not automatically unlawful. The issue is whether minority communities, including Uyghurs, have meaningful and visible community-based institutions through which they can preserve language, culture, memory, traditions and identity in a way that is not exclusively State-administered.

China does have State-supported mechanisms for Uyghur cultural preservation, including recognition of the Xinjiang Uyghur Muqam and Meshrep as forms of intangible cultural heritage. These forms of recognition are important and should not be dismissed. However, intangible-cultural-heritage protection alone is not the same as living, community-led cultural autonomy. A tradition may be preserved as heritage while the community that carries it still lacks sufficient space for association, language use, education, consultation, religious-cultural continuity and self-organised cultural life.

If implementation of the law is to avoid the perception that it may function as an instrument of assimilation, it should not rely only on State-led cultural preservation. It should also allow meaningful, lawful and visible community-based Uyghur cultural associations, cultural centres, language initiatives and consultative structures at regional, local and community levels. These structures would help distinguish peaceful cultural continuity from genuinely unlawful conduct and demonstrate that national unity protects ethnic diversity within common citizenship.

Accordingly, JPTi may recommend that the PRC ensure express safeguards for minority cultural centres, minority-language education, cultural associations, community consultation and protection of lawful ethnic, religious and linguistic expression. Peaceful preservation of Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other minority identities should not be treated as a challenge to national unity. Visible protection of such identities would strengthen the credibility of China’s stated commitment to ethnic equality, unity and common development.

11. Recommended Implementation Safeguards for the PRC Government

The Government of the People’s Republic of China should issue authoritative interpretive guidance confirming that the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress will be implemented consistently with constitutional guarantees of ethnic equality, regional ethnic autonomy, freedom to use and develop minority languages, preservation of customs, cultural heritage protection, minority-language education, freedom of religious belief, and non-discrimination against minors. Such guidance should make clear that unity is not uniformity, integration is not assimilation, and common citizenship must preserve, not weaken, minority identity.

The concepts of “ethnic division,” “destroying ethnic unity and progress,” “hidden dangers in the ethnic field,” and “correct” views of history, culture and religion should be defined narrowly and applied only to concrete unlawful conduct. They should not be used against peaceful criticism, academic research, journalism, religious expression, minority-rights advocacy, family transmission of identity, cultural preservation, lawful community organisation or engagement with international human rights mechanisms.

Implementation should include express safeguards for ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity. China should not rely only on State-led cultural preservation, intangible-cultural-heritage mechanisms or administrative cultural programming. It should also allow meaningful, lawful and visible community-based cultural associations, cultural centres, language initiatives and consultative structures for Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other minority communities.

Education policy should ensure that Mandarin acquisition does not displace meaningful minority-language education. Minority children should be able to master the common national language while retaining literacy, cultural knowledge and family continuity in their own language. Teaching materials should include genuine representation of minority histories, traditions, religions and cultural contributions. Family education provisions should not interfere with lawful transmission of minority language, culture, religion, historical memory or community identity within families.

Religious provisions should respect the internal autonomy of religious communities. Civic loyalty and compliance with general law should not become a basis for prescribing doctrine, reshaping religious identity, controlling clergy formation, or limiting religious education, worship, pastoral life or religious-cultural continuity. Religious communities should not be treated as security risks merely because they maintain historical, linguistic, cultural, theological or transnational religious ties, unless there is evidence of concrete unlawful conduct.

Online regulation, complaints, reporting duties and public interest litigation should be directed at discrimination, incitement to violence, terrorism, coercive separatism, hate speech or other clearly defined unlawful conduct. They should not become mechanisms for silencing minority grievances, peaceful advocacy, alternative historical narratives, religious expression, academic discussion or diaspora communication.

The possible interaction between the ethnic-unity law and the Social Credit System requires specific safeguards. No person, religious community, cultural association, school, entrepreneur, SME or diaspora-linked organisation should face adverse credit-related consequences for peaceful minority-language use, cultural preservation, religious practice, academic work, journalism, family transmission of identity or lawful minority-rights advocacy. Any adverse action should be based on law, clearly defined conduct, evidence, notice, reasons, proportionality, correction mechanisms, credit repair, independent review and effective remedy.

The PRC should accelerate adoption of a comprehensive national Social Credit law clarifying the scope of credit information, competent authorities, conditions for serious untrustworthy listing, permissible legal consequences and remedies. It should prohibit discriminatory or identity-based use of credit governance on grounds of ethnicity, religion, language, cultural identity, family background, diaspora ties or peaceful advocacy. Before legal liability arises, affected persons and SMEs should receive notice, reasons, access to relevant information and a meaningful opportunity to correct alleged conduct where correction is possible.

The institutional complaint and remedy architecture should be clear. Affected persons, communities and enterprises should have access to citizen-complaint channels, administrative reconsideration, administrative litigation before the people’s courts, specialised review where ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious rights are affected, and supervisory mechanisms where public officials abuse power. These domestic remedies should operate alongside, not be replaced by, NHRI or NMIRF-type mechanisms.

Article 63 requires special clarification. The State should expressly exclude peaceful diaspora expression, cultural preservation, religious activity, academic work, journalism, human rights advocacy and lawful criticism from the scope of extraterritorial liability. Cross-border legal cooperation should be limited to clearly defined criminal conduct and accompanied by fair trial guarantees, humane treatment, non-discrimination, access to counsel, protection against refoulement and guarantees against punishment for protected expression.

Host States and international actors should approach the law with legal precision. They should raise concerns about implementation, request safeguards and monitor concrete cases. They should also ensure that extradition, asylum, immigration and mutual legal assistance procedures are not used to expose minority advocates, religious figures, journalists, scholars, entrepreneurs or diaspora representatives to persecution, torture, arbitrary detention or punishment for protected expression.

The core implementation test is clear: the law complies with international human rights standards only if it promotes civic cohesion while preserving minority continuity. It risks becoming an instrument of assimilation if education, language, religion, culture, family identity, community association, diaspora contact or peaceful advocacy are treated as threats to national unity without concrete unlawful conduct.

12. Guidance for Diaspora Organisations, NGOs, UN Mechanisms and OHCHR: From Legal Precision to Constructive Engagement and Domestic Implementation through NHRIs and NMIRFs

Diaspora organisations and NGOs play an indispensable role in documenting violations, preserving memory, supporting families, protecting victims and ensuring that minority voices are not erased from public debate. Their advocacy has brought attention to arbitrary detention, family separation, forced labour, religious restrictions, language concerns, cultural loss, transnational repression and refugee insecurity. These concerns are legitimate and must not be dismissed.

At the same time, advocacy on Uyghur rights, including advocacy concerning the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, would be stronger if it became more legalistic, evidence-based, rights-centred, implementation-oriented and respectful in tone. The central objective should be to improve the lives, security, dignity, mobility, family unity, cultural continuity and economic prospects of Uyghur people, both inside China and in the diaspora. Advocacy should be measured by whether it creates practical openings for protection, dialogue, remedies and concrete improvement, not by the intensity of political confrontation.

The United Nations system, including OHCHR, the High Commissioner and Special Procedures, should not be used as a weapon against selected States. Its proper function is to uphold universal standards, clarify legal obligations, protect rights-holders, prevent reprisals, encourage access, facilitate dialogue and support implementation. The role of the High Commissioner is to cool down the temperature between all parties, bring grievances and concerns into a constructive legal framework, and help affected communities, NGOs, States and national institutions discuss safeguards, remedies and implementation pathways in a serious and respectful manner.

This approach is consistent with the Human Rights Council framework on National Mechanisms for Implementation, Reporting and Follow-up. The UN is important, but supplementary. The decisive test is whether international engagement is translated into domestic implementation through institutions that can act inside the national system. Advocacy should therefore focus not only on UN statements, sanctions, parliamentary declarations or public condemnation, but also on structured engagement with domestic remedies, NHRIs where they exist, NMIRFs or NMIRF-type mechanisms, Ombudsman institutions, parliamentary bodies, courts, administrative-review mechanisms and ethnic-affairs institutions.

The distinction is essential. NHRIs, where they comply with the Paris Principles, provide independent scrutiny. NMIRFs provide governmental coordination and implementation follow-up. Domestic administrative and judicial remedies provide individual protection and correction. These roles are complementary, but they are not interchangeable. Diaspora and NGO advocacy should therefore seek both international attention and domestic follow-up, while avoiding the impression that UN mechanisms can replace effective national remedies.

OHCHR should help facilitate constructive engagement by assisting diaspora organisations and NGOs to formulate concerns in legal terms, identify relevant domestic institutions, frame requests in a manner capable of implementation, and engage national bodies without turning the process into geopolitical confrontation. Serious allegations should be addressed firmly, but concerns about politicisation should be answered through transparency, balanced methodology, legal precision and constructive facilitation.

In the context of China, this requires institutional realism. China should not be described as not having a GANHRI-accredited Paris Principles NHRI. However, that does not make all domestic institutions irrelevant. Advocacy should identify which domestic bodies can receive complaints, review administrative action, address ethnic-affairs concerns, respond to official misconduct, provide judicial or administrative remedies, or coordinate implementation.

This also requires a shift in advocacy method. General accusations should be replaced, wherever possible, with clearly identified rights, facts, legal standards, affected groups, State obligations, competent institutions and requested remedies. Instead of relying only on broad political labels, advocates should specify concrete legal issues: family contact, travel documents, protection from refoulement, religious freedom, minority-language education, cultural associations, protection of SMEs, safeguards against arbitrary detention, due process, non-discrimination, effective remedies and protection against transnational repression.

The same applies to Western legislation, parliamentary mechanisms, sanctions regimes, forced-labour import controls and unilateral coercive measures. These tools may sometimes raise pressure, protect supply chains or respond to serious abuses. However, they are not designed primarily to bring prosperity, reconciliation, cultural preservation or improved daily life to Uyghur people. If they become the centre of advocacy, they may harden positions, narrow diplomatic space, increase suspicion toward diaspora communities and reinforce the security framing that advocates seek to challenge.

Diaspora and NGO advocacy should avoid creating the perception that Uyghur communities are being instrumentalised by foreign policy agendas. A minority community should not be treated as a proxy for Western strategic competition with China. The credibility of Uyghur advocacy depends on its independence, legal seriousness and human-centred purpose. Its strongest argument is not alignment with any geopolitical bloc, but the entitlement of Uyghurs, like all peoples and minorities, to equality, dignity, family life, religion, language, culture, education, work, mobility, due process and protection from discrimination.

The rhetoric of ultimatums should therefore be replaced by constructive and respectful requests. These may include implementation safeguards under the law; clarification that peaceful cultural, linguistic, religious and diaspora activity is not unlawful; protection of Uyghur language and education; lawful community-based cultural associations; family contact and travel documents; non-discriminatory treatment of Uyghur entrepreneurs and SMEs; clear procedures for security-related measures; access to administrative and judicial remedies; and structured dialogue with affected communities.

Diaspora organisations and NGOs should also strengthen internal discipline. Claims should distinguish between verified facts, survivor testimony, legal allegations, political characterisations and advocacy objectives. Evidence should be preserved in a manner capable of supporting legal, administrative or diplomatic follow-up. Public messaging should avoid overstating what any mechanism can deliver. Where sanctions are requested, advocates should explain the intended protective effect and assess possible unintended consequences for ordinary people, families, students, workers and entrepreneurs.

The most persuasive advocacy connects legal standards to practical outcomes. For Uyghur communities, this means moving from a paradigm of rhetoric, confrontation, sanctions and punishment toward a paradigm of protection, participation, cultural continuity, lawful mobility, family unity, economic engagement and dialogue. The purpose of international advocacy should be to open doors, not only to close them. It should create pressure for lawful reform, while also preserving pathways for cooperation.

Accordingly, diaspora organisations and NGOs should reframe engagement with the law around concrete safeguards rather than only rejection. They should ask how the law will protect minority language, religion, culture, education, family identity, cultural associations, diaspora contact and lawful advocacy. They should request interpretive guidance, complaint mechanisms, independent review, community consultation and protection against discriminatory implementation. This would not weaken Uyghur advocacy. It would make it more credible, more legally defensible and more difficult to dismiss as politicised, while better serving the people whose rights are at stake.

Conclusion

China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress should be assessed with legal precision, respect for domestic legislative attribution, and close attention to international human rights standards. The law was adopted by the National People’s Congress and should be attributed accordingly. Its relationship to China’s broader political framework may be analysed, but slogans should not replace legal reasoning.

The law’s stated objectives of unity, interethnic harmony, common prosperity, social stability and development are not inherently unlawful. The central legal issue is implementation. If the law is used to expand participation while preserving minority identity, it may operate as a framework for integration. If it is used to weaken minority languages, reshape religious identity, control family memory, silence peaceful advocacy, securitise ethnic or religious communities, or expose diaspora members to extraterritorial liability for protected expression, it would raise serious human rights concerns.

The strongest and most defensible conclusion is safeguard-oriented. The law requires narrow interpretation, rights-protective implementation, procedural guarantees, and explicit assurances for minority-language education, cultural continuity, religious autonomy, children’s rights, family transmission of identity, freedom of expression, diaspora advocacy, non-refoulement and protection against transnational repression.

The central principle is straightforward. A State may promote unity, but it must not erase identity. A State may promote a common language, but it must not weaken the survival of minority languages. A State may protect national security, but it must not treat an entire ethnic, linguistic or religious community as a threat. A State may build nationhood, but it must do so in a way that preserves the dignity, memory, culture, religion, language and participation of all persons who belong to that nation.

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