JPTi Submits Supplementary Update to the United Nations on the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Case

Urging International Intervention to Protect NHRI Independence and Restore Ms. Majome

Geneva, 3 June 2026, Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTi) has submitted a supplementary update to the United Nations Special Procedures, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, GANHRI, the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation, and the President of the Human Rights Council concerning the unlawful removal of Ms. Fungayi Jessie Majome from the leadership of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC).

The supplementary update follows JPTi’s earlier complaint of 27 April 2026, which brought the case before the United Nations and raised concerns regarding alleged reprisals, executive interference with Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution, and violations of the Paris Principles.

The original announcement is available here:https://www.jpti.ch/post/jpti-brings-zimbabwe-human-rights-commission-removal-case-before-the-united-nations

The new submission addresses subsequent developments in the related Constitutional Court proceedings in Zimbabwe, Case No. CCZ 29/26. JPTi submits that the domestic filings confirm the central concern raised in the original complaint: the President’s position relies on the concept of “reassignment” to justify the removal of Ms. Majome from the ZHRC without triggering the constitutional safeguards governing removal from office.

JPTi argues that a measure removing the Chairperson of an independent National Human Rights Institution from office cannot be placed outside constitutional and international safeguards merely by being described as a “reassignment.” Such reasoning would undermine security of tenure, weaken the independence of the ZHRC, and create a dangerous precedent for executive interference with independent commissions supporting democracy.

The supplementary update further emphasises that the ZHRC’s A-status accreditation within the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions system confirms that its independence, security of tenure, and real and perceived autonomy are matters of international human rights concern. JPTi stresses that any accreditation-related response should be protective and remedial, not punitive towards the ZHRC. The focus should be on restoring Ms. Majome to the full and unhindered exercise of her mandate, protecting commissioners and staff, and securing guarantees of non-repetition.

JPTi also enclosed its draft input prepared for the lawyers working on the heads of argument in the Constitutional Court proceedings. That input identifies international human rights standards relevant to the domestic constitutional issues, including the Paris Principles, the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation’s General Observations, relevant Human Rights Council resolutions, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Human Rights Committee General Comments.

JPTi respectfully reiterates its request for urgent and coordinated international intervention, including, where appropriate, separate or joint communications and public statements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the relevant Special Procedures mandate holders, coordinated with GANHRI, the SCA, and the President of the Human Rights Council within their respective mandates.

The case raises issues that go beyond one office-holder. It concerns the protection of National Human Rights Institutions from executive interference, the security of tenure of their leadership, the prevention of reprisals against those carrying out human rights mandates, and the need to ensure that Zimbabwe’s domestic human rights protection system remains independent, credible, and effective.

The PDF versions of the Supplementary Update and JPTi’s Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument may be accessed below. For transparency and ease of reference, the full text of both documents is also reproduced after this announcement.

PDF Documents

Supplementary Update to Complaint concerning Violations, Reprisals and Interference with the Independence of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, dated 3 June 2026

Supplementary Update ZHRC final 03.06.2026.pdf

Download PDF • 286KB

JPTi Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument, dated 2 June 2026

JPTi Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument.pdf

Download PDF • 266KB

Full Text of the Supplementary Update

Subject: Supplementary Update to Complaint concerning Violations, Reprisals and Interference with the Independence of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission

3 June 2026

Dear Special Procedures Mandate Holders,

Your Excellency United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,

Your Excellency President of the Human Rights Council,

Distinguished Chairpersons,

Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTi) respectfully submits this supplementary update in its capacity as the duly authorised representative of Ms. Fungayi Jessie Majome before the United Nations and other international human rights mechanisms, as confirmed in the Letter of Authorization and Consent submitted with the original complaint of 27 April 2026.

This supplementary update concerns developments arising after the original submission, including filings made in the related public-interest constitutional proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe, Case No. CCZ 29/26. Those proceedings concern the same presidential measure of 10 April 2026 and are submitted as relevant and corroborative material because they disclose the legal position now advanced by the Attorney General on behalf of the President of Zimbabwe.

Ms. Majome is the direct victim of the presidential measure of 10 April 2026, which removed her from the leadership of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), Zimbabwe’s constitutionally established National Human Rights Institution. The measure affected not only her individual rights and security of tenure, but also the independence, credibility and effective functioning of the ZHRC as an institution required to operate in accordance with Zimbabwe’s Constitution and the Paris Principles.

The international significance of that institutional harm is reinforced by the ZHRC’s A-status accreditation within the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) system. As recalled in the materials submitted with the original complaint, the ZHRC has held A status since 2016 and was re-accredited in 2023. That status reflects formal compliance with the Paris Principles and confirms that the independence, security of tenure, and real and perceived autonomy of the ZHRC are matters of international human rights concern, not only domestic constitutional concern. At the same time, JPTi respectfully emphasises that the accreditation framework should be applied in a protective and remedial manner. The issue is not that the ZHRC, as an institution, should be penalised for executive interference. The issue is that executive interference must be remedied so that the ZHRC’s independence, credibility, and A-status compliance are restored and strengthened in substance. Any international or accreditation-related response should therefore focus on restoring Ms. Majome to the full and unhindered exercise of her mandate, protecting commissioners and staff, and securing guarantees of non-repetition, rather than on measures that would further weaken the ZHRC’s ability to function as Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution.

This case also illustrates the need for the United Nations system, including OHCHR, to reconsider any approach that links access to United Nations platforms in Geneva and New York too narrowly to GANHRI accreditation status alone. Accreditation remains important, but it should not operate as the sole gateway for constitutionally recognised domestic human rights and democratic oversight institutions to engage with the United Nations when their independence is under threat. Where a State’s Constitution establishes independent bodies with clear mandates to protect democracy, promote and protect human rights, monitor public power, and contribute to accountability, such institutions should be able to engage meaningfully and directly with the United Nations human rights system. In Zimbabwe, this is particularly relevant to the independent commissions supporting democracy under Chapter 12 of the Constitution: the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

This concern is consistent with JPTi’s broader institutional reform analysis set out in its publication, The Structural Impunity Gap in Transnational Repression: Attribution, Selectivity, Non-State Actors, and the Operational Limits of Existing UN Human Rights Mechanisms. Although that publication addresses transnational repression, its institutional lesson is relevant here: protection gaps arise when complex human rights situations are handled through fragmented, State-centred, mandate-specific channels that fail to aggregate responsibility and activate timely protection. The same risk exists where NHRI access, accreditation, Special Procedures communications, OHCHR engagement, and domestic constitutional recognition operate in separate silos. In cases of executive interference with an independent domestic human rights institution, such fragmentation may allow the State to benefit from formal representation while the institution’s lawful and independent leadership is weakened or displaced.

JPTi respectfully submits that United Nations access arrangements should be reformed so that they are guided not only by accreditation categories, but also by constitutional recognition, the existence of a clear protection and promotion mandate, and the need to protect independent domestic human rights institutions in moments of crisis. Access to United Nations platforms should therefore be available, as a baseline, to constitutionally recognised domestic institutions with human rights, democratic oversight, equality, media freedom, electoral integrity, peace, reconciliation, or accountability mandates. GANHRI accreditation should remain relevant to the assessment of Paris Principles compliance and to appropriate modalities of participation, but it should not be the only basis on which such institutions are heard, protected, or enabled to communicate with United Nations mechanisms.

In situations of contested leadership, executive interference, or reprisals against office-holders, access should be operationalised through the lawful and independent leadership of the institution and should not be used to legitimise executive capture or contested representation. This would allow the United Nations system to preserve engagement with constitutionally recognised domestic protection bodies while maintaining effective leverage where their independence is threatened. Such an approach would strengthen, rather than weaken, the purpose of the Paris Principles: to support independent human rights protection at the domestic level and to ensure that those who protect rights are themselves protected.

The newly available domestic filings are relevant because they confirm the position advanced by the Attorney General on behalf of the President in the Respondent’s Opposing Affidavit: that Ms. Majome was “reassigned” rather than removed, and that the constitutional safeguards governing removal were therefore not engaged. This position reinforces the central concern raised in JPTi’s original complaint, namely that executive interference with the leadership of an independent National Human Rights Institution is being justified through terminology that would bypass constitutional and Paris Principles safeguards.

That explanation is incompatible with sections 235 and 237 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Paris Principles, and the guidance of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation on security of tenure. A measure that terminates the tenure of the Chairperson of an independent National Human Rights Institution cannot be placed outside the safeguards governing removal merely by being described as a reassignment.

The attached documents are significant because they confirm what is absent from the position advanced by the Attorney General on behalf of the President in the Respondent’s Opposing Affidavit. It is not asserted that the constitutional safeguards were fulfilled, including that an independent tribunal was appointed to inquire into any lawful ground for removal, that such a tribunal recommended Ms. Majome’s removal, that she was found guilty of gross misconduct, gross incompetence or incapacity, or that any independent process was followed. Instead, the position advanced by the Attorney General on behalf of the President is that none of these safeguards was required because the measure was described as a “reassignment.”

This is precisely the type of executive circumvention that security-of-tenure guarantees are intended to prevent. If accepted, such reasoning would allow the executive to avoid constitutional removal safeguards and Paris Principles protections simply by changing the language used to describe the measure. This would render the independence of the ZHRC vulnerable in practice, even if formally guaranteed in law.

The related domestic filings, in particular the Applicant’s Answering Affidavit, directly challenge that position. They argue that the distinction between “reassignment” and removal is semantic, and that any executive act terminating a member’s tenure in an independent commission must be treated as removal, regardless of the label attached to it. They further emphasise that members of independent commissions are not deployable civil servants, that the Public Service Commission is not an independent commission supporting democracy under Chapter 12 of the Constitution, and that transferring Ms. Majome from the ZHRC to the Public Service Commission extinguished her tenure as Chairperson of the ZHRC.

This constitutional argument is directly aligned with Zimbabwe’s constitutional framework. Chapter 12 of the Constitution establishes a specific category of independent commissions supporting democracy, namely the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. These bodies are not ordinary administrative units of the executive. They are constitutionally protected institutions whose independence is central to democratic oversight and human rights protection.

Section 235 protects the independence of those commissions and requires them to operate without direction or control. Section 237 regulates the removal of members of independent commissions and incorporates the procedure applicable to the removal of judges under section 187. Section 90(1) requires the President to uphold, defend, obey and respect the Constitution and to ensure that it is faithfully observed. Section 243 confers on the ZHRC its mandate to promote, protect and monitor human rights.

The Constitution does not establish a general presidential power to reassign members or chairpersons of independent commissions supporting democracy. Such a power would be incompatible with the structure and purpose of Chapter 12. A member or chairperson of the ZHRC cannot be moved by unilateral executive direction to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission, or the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, nor can such a person be moved out of the Chapter 12 framework altogether, without compliance with the constitutional safeguards governing the interruption or termination of tenure. Any appointment to another constitutional office would have to follow the appointment procedure applicable to that office. It could not be achieved by executive redeployment.

The present case is even more serious because Ms. Majome was not moved from one independent commission supporting democracy to another. She was moved from the ZHRC, Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution and a Chapter 12 independent commission supporting democracy, to the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission is not one of the Chapter 12 independent commissions supporting democracy. The measure therefore removed Ms. Majome from the protected leadership of Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution and placed her in a different constitutional framework outside Chapter 12.

The President’s reliance on an alleged earlier “reassignment” of Ms. Majome from the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission to the ZHRC does not justify the measure of 10 April 2026. JPTi does not invite the United Nations mechanisms to determine the legality of that earlier transition. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 19 March 2024 development resulted in Ms. Majome assuming the specific and protected office of Chairperson of the ZHRC. Once she entered that office, the constitutional and international safeguards attached to the leadership of a National Human Rights Institution were fully engaged.

The earlier transition into the ZHRC cannot be converted into a precedent for moving Ms. Majome out of the ZHRC by executive direction. It was, at most, an entry into a protected constitutional office. It did not create a continuing presidential power to redeploy the Chairperson of Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution at will. Under both the Constitution and the Paris Principles, the tenure of the Chairperson of the ZHRC could only be interrupted through lawful procedures consistent with security of tenure, independence, due process and protection from executive interference.

The domestic filings also reject the suggestion advanced on behalf of the President that the matter is, in substance, a labour dispute. The position taken in response is that the issue concerns the institutional independence of an independent commission supporting democracy and the public interest in a Human Rights Commission capable of operating free from executive dictation, fear or favour. This is fully consistent with JPTi’s position before the United Nations: the harm is not merely personal to Ms. Majome. It is systemic and public.

The measure is incompatible with the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. The Paris Principles require National Human Rights Institutions to have independence guaranteed by law, a broad mandate, adequate powers to act freely, and institutional arrangements capable of ensuring stability and autonomy. These principles are not technical accreditation language. They are the foundation of independent human rights protection. A National Human Rights Institution, particularly one holding A-status accreditation, cannot be considered genuinely independent if its Chairperson may be removed from office by executive action merely because that action is described as a “reassignment.”

The same conclusion follows from the General Observations and accreditation practice of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation. General Observation 2.1 on guarantee of tenure requires an independent and objective dismissal process, strict compliance with substantive and procedural requirements prescribed by law, and protection against removal at the discretion of the appointing authority. A “reassignment” that terminates the Chairperson’s tenure in the ZHRC has the same effect on independence and security of tenure as removal. It cannot lawfully be treated as falling outside the safeguards that govern removal.

If Zimbabwe’s Constitution were interpreted to permit the President to move the Chairperson of the ZHRC out of office without triggering any independent removal process, such an interpretation would itself be incompatible with the Paris Principles, the SCA’s guidance on security of tenure, and the requirement that National Human Rights Institutions enjoy both real and perceived independence. The protection of tenure must be effective in practice. It cannot depend on the terminology chosen by the executive authority responsible for the measure.

The President’s position therefore creates a direct challenge to the Paris Principles and the SCA’s interpretative guidance. If the executive may move the Chairperson of the ZHRC out of office without triggering any independent removal process, the protection of tenure becomes ineffective. This affects not only the formal independence of the ZHRC, but also its real and perceived independence, public credibility and ability to carry out its mandate without fear of reprisal.

The present case also illustrates a broader concern raised by JPTi at the International Ombudsman Conference in Rome in May 2026. The real test of a National Human Rights Institution is not merely its label or accreditation status, but whether it can protect people, speak independently, examine public power, engage with international mechanisms and contribute to democratic accountability. Where the leadership of such an institution is removed after it speaks publicly on human rights concerns, the message sent to other oversight actors is that independence may carry personal and institutional consequences. That message is incompatible with the purpose of the Paris Principles and with the role of NHRIs as independent safeguards within the domestic human rights protection system.

The enclosed JPTi draft input for the lawyers develops this point in the context of the pending Constitutional Court proceedings. It explains why the independence of the ZHRC, the security of tenure of its Chairperson, and the protection of the Commission from executive interference are not only domestic constitutional issues, but also matters governed by international human rights standards. In particular, it addresses the Paris Principles, the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation’s General Observations, relevant Human Rights Council resolutions, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments. The central point is that the Constitution of Zimbabwe should be interpreted and applied consistently with Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations and with the requirement that its National Human Rights Institution remain independent in law and in practice.

The case therefore falls directly within the concerns reflected in Human Rights Council resolution 57/23 on National Human Rights Institutions, which reaffirms the importance of independent and effective NHRIs in accordance with the Paris Principles and calls for protection of NHRIs, their members and staff from intimidation and reprisals. It also engages the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by General Assembly resolution 53/144, because Ms. Majome’s conduct through the ZHRC involved monitoring, reporting and defending human rights in a matter of significant public interest.

The matter also engages Zimbabwe’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Zimbabwe acceded on 13 May 1991. The ZHRC’s public reporting concerned rights protected by the Covenant, including freedom of expression, participation in public affairs, peaceful public engagement, equality, personal security and the right to an effective remedy. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on article 19, General Comment No. 25 on article 25, General Comment No. 37 on article 21, and General Comment No. 31 on effective implementation and remedies are relevant because they support a constitutional interpretation that protects independent human rights monitoring, public reporting and effective domestic safeguards. Executive action that penalises, or appears to penalise, the leadership of an NHRI after it reports on concerns affecting public participation and constitutional reform is inconsistent with those standards.

The case is also relevant to Human Rights Council resolution 51/33 on national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up. That resolution recognises the importance of effective domestic structures for implementing international human rights obligations and recommendations. Properly understood, such structures require both governmental coordination and independent oversight. National Mechanisms for Implementation, Reporting and Follow-up are governmental coordination structures that assist the State in preparing reports, coordinating ministries, tracking recommendations and organising implementation. National Human Rights Institutions, by contrast, must remain independent bodies of monitoring, investigation, public assessment and accountability.

This distinction is important in the present case. The Government may coordinate implementation, but the ZHRC must be able to examine independently whether implementation is genuine, effective and rights-compliant. The State may report progress, but the ZHRC must be able to identify gaps, omissions, risks and cases of non-implementation. Presidential interference with the leadership of the ZHRC therefore weakens Zimbabwe’s domestic human rights protection architecture as a whole, including the independent pillar required for credible implementation, reporting and follow-up.

The related Constitutional Court proceedings remain active. On 28 May 2026, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe issued a letter calling for heads of argument within 15 business days from service. This confirms that the domestic proceedings continue, but no effective domestic remedy has yet been secured. The existence of those proceedings does not diminish the need for international engagement. Rather, it confirms that the legality of the President’s measure is seriously contested and that the international dimensions of the case remain urgent.

For this reason, JPTi also encloses its draft input prepared for the lawyers working on the heads of argument in the Constitutional Court proceedings. That document is submitted for the information of the international human rights mechanisms and institutions addressed in this supplementary update because it identifies the international human rights standards that may assist the Court in interpreting the Constitution consistently with Zimbabwe’s obligations and commitments. It is not submitted to duplicate the domestic pleadings, but to show why the domestic constitutional question is directly connected to the international protection of National Human Rights Institutions, the Paris Principles, and the prevention of reprisals against those carrying out human rights mandates.

JPTi respectfully submits that these subsequent developments strengthen the original complaint. They show that the President’s position is not based on proof of due process, lawful grounds or independent review. It is based on the assertion that the action was not removal because it was called reassignment. If accepted, that position would create a dangerous precedent for executive interference with the tenure and leadership of independent commissions, including National Human Rights Institutions.

JPTi therefore respectfully requests that the Special Procedures mandate holders and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights treat this supplementary update as further support for urgent intervention with the Government of Zimbabwe, including, where appropriate, a joint communication in the form of an urgent appeal and/or allegation letter. JPTi further requests that such intervention call upon the Government to rescind the decision of 10 April 2026, restore Ms. Majome to the full and unhindered exercise of her functions, duties, powers and privileges as Chairperson of the ZHRC, guarantee her physical and professional safety, and refrain from any further acts of intimidation, harassment, retaliation or interference with the functioning, composition, leadership or tenure of the ZHRC.

JPTi also respectfully invites GANHRI and the SCA to consider these developments in any ongoing or future assessment of the ZHRC’s compliance with the Paris Principles. The President’s position that the Constitution is silent on reassignment raises serious concerns regarding the adequacy of safeguards protecting the stability of tenure of ZHRC commissioners, the real and perceived independence of the institution, and the risk of direct or indirect executive control over its leadership.

JPTi further reiterates its request for coordinated action by the relevant Special Procedures mandate holders, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, GANHRI and the SCA. Such coordination is necessary to ensure that the international response is not limited to accreditation consequences, but contributes to restoration of mandate, security of tenure, protection of commissioners and staff, and guarantees of non-repetition.

JPTi further invites the United Nations and GANHRI mechanisms addressed in this supplementary update to consider the need for a rapid protection and referral approach for Ombudsman institutions, National Human Rights Institutions, their leadership, members and staff when they face removal, intimidation, threats or reprisals for carrying out human rights work. Such protection should not wait for the next accreditation cycle or the conclusion of prolonged domestic proceedings. Timely and visible action is essential because silence is not neutral where it contributes to a chilling effect on independent human rights oversight.

In view of the continuing nature of the harm, the pending domestic proceedings, the President’s reliance on the concept of “reassignment,” and the risk that such reasoning may be used to undermine other independent commissions, JPTi respectfully reiterates its request for urgent and coordinated international intervention. This should include, where appropriate, separate or joint communications and public statements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the relevant Special Procedures mandate holders, coordinated with GANHRI, the SCA and the President of the Human Rights Council within their respective mandates, underscoring the need to restore Ms. Majome to the leadership of the ZHRC, protect the Commission from executive interference, uphold the Paris Principles, ensure that the Constitutional Court is guided by applicable international human rights standards, and prevent further reprisals against National Human Rights Institutions, their leadership, members and staff.

Enclosed with this supplementary update are the following materials:

1. Notice of Opposition and Opposing Affidavit filed on behalf of the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe in Case No. CCZ 29/26, received by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe on 20 May 2026.

2. Answering Affidavit filed in the related Constitutional Court proceedings, received by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe on 28 May 2026.

3. Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe letter calling for heads of argument in Case No. CCZ 29/26, dated 28 May 2026.

4. JPTi Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument, dated 2 June 2026

JPTi kindly requests acknowledgment of receipt of this supplementary update and confirmation that the enclosed materials have been received successfully.

Please accept, Distinguished United Nations Human Rights Council Experts, Excellencies and Distinguished Chairpersons, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Sharof Azizov

Executive Director

Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTi)

Full Text of JPTi’s Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument

2 June 2026

Subject: JPTi Draft Input on International Human Rights Standards for the Heads of Argument

Dear Sir/Madam,

Thank you for sharing the Applicant’s Answering Affidavit in the Constitutional Court proceedings. I have reviewed it with particular attention to how the international human rights dimension may support the heads of argument now being prepared by the lawyers.

Please find below JPTi’s draft input for the lawyers, focusing on the Paris Principles, the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation guidance, relevant United Nations resolutions, the ICCPR, and Human Rights Committee General Comments. The draft is intended to assist in strengthening the constitutional argument by showing that the protection of the ZHRC’s independence and your security of tenure is not only a matter of domestic constitutional law, but also directly connected to Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations and the standards applicable to National Human Rights Institutions.

The main point is that the President’s reliance on “reassignment” cannot be used to bypass the constitutional safeguards governing removal from office. In our view, any interpretation that would allow the Chairperson of the ZHRC to be moved out of office by executive action, without an independent process and without compliance with constitutional safeguards, would be inconsistent with the Constitution, the Paris Principles, the SCA’s guidance on security of tenure, and Zimbabwe’s obligations under international human rights law.

I hope this will be useful to the legal team in preparing the heads of argument. JPTi remains ready to assist further, including with refinements or additional references if required.

Warm regards,

Sharof Azizov

Executive Director

Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTi)

IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ZIMBABWEHELD AT HARARE

CASE NO. CCZ 29/26

In the matter between:

ALLAN CHIPOYI

Applicant

and

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

Respondent

APPLICANT’S SUPPLEMENTARY HEADS OF ARGUMENT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, THE PARIS PRINCIPLES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. These supplementary heads of argument address the international human rights standards relevant to the constitutional issues before this Honourable Court. They are filed in support of the Applicant’s contention that the Respondent’s purported “reassignment” of Ms. Fungayi Jessie Majome from the position of Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (“ZHRC”) to the Public Service Commission was, in law and effect, an unlawful interruption of protected tenure in an independent commission supporting democracy.

2. The Applicant’s case is not based on a private employment grievance. It concerns the constitutional independence of the ZHRC, the security of tenure of its Chairperson, the integrity of Chapter 12 institutions, and the public interest in a national human rights institution capable of acting without executive direction, fear, favour or prejudice.

3. The Respondent’s position is that Ms. Majome was not removed from office, but “reassigned”; that the procedures governing removal under sections 237 and 187 of the Constitution were therefore not triggered; and that the Constitution is silent about reassignment.

4. The Applicant submits that this position is constitutionally untenable. It would allow the executive to achieve indirectly, through the terminology of “reassignment,” what the Constitution permits only through a regulated removal process. It would also undermine Zimbabwe’s compliance with the international standards applicable to National Human Rights Institutions (“NHRIs”), in particular the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (“Paris Principles”).

5. The ZHRC is not only a Chapter 12 independent commission supporting democracy. It is also Zimbabwe’s internationally recognised National Human Rights Institution. It has held A-status accreditation within the GANHRI system, reflecting formal compliance with the Paris Principles. That status confirms the international importance of the institution’s independence, security of tenure and protection from executive interference.

6. The Respondent’s interpretation would expose the Chairperson and members of the ZHRC to executive redeployment at will. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Paris Principles, the General Observations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (“SCA”), and Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations.

II. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

7. For purposes of these supplementary heads, the following issues arise. First, whether the Constitution confers on the President any general power to reassign members or chairpersons of independent commissions supporting democracy.

8. Second, whether the President may interrupt or terminate the tenure of the Chairperson of the ZHRC by describing the measure as a “reassignment” rather than removal.

9. Third, whether a purported reassignment from the ZHRC to the Public Service Commission is compatible with the constitutional framework governing independent commissions supporting democracy.

10. Fourth, whether any alleged earlier reassignment of Ms. Majome into the ZHRC can create a precedent for her later removal or redeployment out of that institution.

11. Fifth, whether the Constitution should be interpreted consistently with Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations, the Paris Principles, the SCA’s guidance on security of tenure, and relevant United Nations resolutions and treaty body guidance.

III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

12. The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not treat international human rights law as irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, it expressly requires courts and other bodies to take international law into account when interpreting the Declaration of Rights.

13. Section 46(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that, when interpreting Chapter 4, a court, tribunal, forum or body must take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party.

14. Section 46(1)(a) further requires courts to give full effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 4, while section 46(1)(b) requires courts to promote the values and principles underlying a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom.

15. Section 46 is directly relevant because the ZHRC’s mandate concerns the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, and because the circumstances leading to Ms. Majome’s removal arose from the ZHRC’s public reporting on alleged violations of rights relating to freedom of expression, participation in public affairs, equality, dignity, personal security and peaceful public engagement.

16. In addition, section 326(1) provides that customary international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe unless inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Section 326(2) requires every court and tribunal, when interpreting legislation, to adopt any reasonable interpretation consistent with applicable customary international law in preference to an inconsistent interpretation.

17. Section 327(6) similarly provides that, when interpreting legislation, every court and tribunal must adopt any reasonable interpretation consistent with any international convention, treaty or agreement binding on Zimbabwe in preference to an alternative interpretation inconsistent with that instrument. Section 34 further provides that the State must ensure that all international conventions, treaties and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party are incorporated into domestic law.

18. These provisions do not displace the supremacy of the Constitution. They do, however, establish a constitutional instruction that domestic law and constitutional rights should be interpreted, where reasonably possible, consistently with Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations and commitments.

19. In the present matter, that instruction requires this Honourable Court to interpret sections 235, 237, 187, 90 and 243 in a manner that protects institutional independence, security of tenure and effective remedies, rather than in a manner that permits executive circumvention of those safeguards.

20. A constitutional interpretation that allows the President to remove the Chairperson of the ZHRC by describing removal as “reassignment” would be inconsistent with Zimbabwe’s international human rights commitments and with the standards applicable to NHRIs under the Paris Principles.

IV. CHAPTER 12 INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE

21. Chapter 12 of the Constitution establishes a specific category of institutions: independent commissions supporting democracy. These are the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

22. These institutions are not ordinary administrative bodies. They are not departments of the executive. They are constitutional oversight bodies established to support democracy, accountability, rights protection and public trust.

23. Section 235 of the Constitution gives practical content to that status. It provides that independent commissions are independent and are not subject to the direction or control of anyone; must act in accordance with the Constitution; and must exercise their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. It further prohibits interference with the functioning of independent commissions.

24. Section 237 regulates removal from office of members of independent commissions. It provides limited grounds and incorporates the procedure applicable to the removal of judges under section 187. The effect is to place members of independent commissions under special constitutional protection.

25. These safeguards are not privileges conferred for the personal benefit of commissioners. They exist for the public. They ensure that independent commissions are able to act as checks on public power and to perform their functions without fear of executive retaliation. The ZHRC occupies a particularly important position within this framework because it is the national institution constitutionally mandated to promote, protect and monitor human rights under section 243. The interpretation of Chapter 12 must therefore be purposive. It must protect the substance of independence, not merely its appearance.

V. THERE IS NO GENERAL PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO REASSIGN MEMBERS OR CHAIRS OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY

26. The Constitution does not establish a general presidential power to reassign members or chairpersons of independent commissions supporting democracy. Such a power would be contrary to the nature of Chapter 12 institutions. The very purpose of Chapter 12 is to create institutions that are protected from executive control. Members and chairpersons of independent commissions supporting democracy are not deployable civil servants. They do not hold transferable executive postings. They hold constitutionally protected offices with defined appointment and removal procedures.

27. The President may exercise only such powers as the Constitution confers. Where the Constitution provides a specific process for appointment and removal of members of independent commissions, that process cannot be bypassed by an implied or unwritten power of reassignment. A member or chairperson of the ZHRC cannot be moved by unilateral executive direction to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission, or the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

28. Nor can a member or chairperson of another independent commission supporting democracy be moved into or out of the ZHRC through executive redeployment. If a person is to assume office in another independent commission, the appointment process applicable to that institution must be followed. If the person’s existing tenure in another independent commission is to be interrupted or terminated, the removal safeguards must be respected.

29. The Constitution therefore does not permit executive movement either within Chapter 12 or out of Chapter 12 if the effect is to interrupt protected tenure in an independent commission. To hold otherwise would make security of tenure dependent on executive vocabulary. It would allow removal to be achieved by calling it reassignment.

VI. NON-CHAPTER 12 COMMISSIONS CANNOT BE USED TO CIRCUMVENT CHAPTER 12 PROTECTIONS

30. The same principle applies with even greater force where the purported destination is not a Chapter 12 independent commission supporting democracy. The Public Service Commission is established under section 202 of the Constitution. It is not one of the independent commissions supporting democracy under Chapter 12.

31. The Public Service Commission belongs to a different constitutional framework concerned with the public service. It does not enjoy the same constitutional role as the five independent commissions supporting democracy.

32. A power to appoint a person to the Public Service Commission, if properly exercised under the relevant constitutional provisions, is not a power to remove that person from the ZHRC. Appointment to one constitutional office and removal from another are legally distinct acts. The one cannot be used as a disguised mechanism for the other.

33. Even if the President possessed a lawful power to appoint Ms. Majome as a commissioner in the Public Service Commission, that would not extinguish the constitutional safeguards attaching to her existing office as Chairperson of the ZHRC. The termination or interruption of her tenure in the ZHRC still had to comply with section 237, read with section 187.

34. The present case is therefore not a neutral administrative transfer. It is the removal of the Chairperson of Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution from a protected Chapter 12 office and her placement in a different constitutional body outside that framework. That outcome is incompatible with the constitutional design of independent commissions supporting democracy.

VII. THE MARCH 2024 TRANSITION INTO THE ZHRC DOES NOT CREATE A CONTINUING POWER OF PRESIDENTIAL REASSIGNMENT

35. The Respondent relies on an alleged earlier reassignment of Ms. Majome from the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission to the ZHRC in March 2024. That reliance is misplaced.

36. The Applicant does not invite this Honourable Court to determine the legality of that earlier transition for its own sake. The relevant point is that, however that transition was described, it resulted in Ms. Majome assuming the office of Chairperson of the ZHRC.

37. Once Ms. Majome assumed office as Chairperson of the ZHRC, she entered a protected constitutional office within Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution. That office carried with it security of tenure under the Constitution and protection under international standards governing NHRIs.

38. The March 2024 transition into the ZHRC cannot be treated as a precedent authorising future executive redeployment out of the ZHRC. It was, at most, a one-way transition into a protected constitutional office. It did not create a continuing presidential power to move Ms. Majome out of that office at will.

39. The fact that a person may enter protected office through appointment or transition does not mean that the person may later be removed from that protected office by executive discretion. The protection attaches upon assumption of the protected office.

40. In the context of the ZHRC, the point is reinforced by the Paris Principles. Once Ms. Majome assumed leadership of Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution, her tenure became part of the institutional guarantees required for NHRI independence. The earlier transition cannot weaken those guarantees. It cannot convert the Chairperson of Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution into a transferable executive official.

VIII. THE ZHRC’S A-STATUS ACCREDITATION UNDER THE PARIS PRINCIPLES

41. The ZHRC is Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution and has held A-status accreditation within the GANHRI system. GANHRI has recorded that the ZHRC has been an A-status accredited institution since 2016 and was re-accredited with A status in 2023. A status signifies formal compliance with the Paris Principles. This is highly relevant to the present matter.

42. The Court is not being asked to determine accreditation status. That is a matter for GANHRI and the SCA. However, the ZHRC’s internationally recognised A status confirms the nature of the institution whose independence is at stake.

43. The Court is interpreting the Constitution in relation to an institution that is part of the international NHRI system and whose credibility depends on compliance with the Paris Principles. The Court should avoid any interpretation that would place Zimbabwe’s internationally recognised NHRI outside the standards that justify and sustain its A-status accreditation.

44. A finding that the President may remove the Chairperson of the ZHRC by executive reassignment would create a direct conflict with the institutional independence required by the Paris Principles. It would also expose the ZHRC to the risk that its real and perceived independence is undermined.

IX. THE PARIS PRINCIPLES REQUIRE EFFECTIVE INDEPENDENCE, NOT MERELY FORMAL STATUS

45. The Paris Principles, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993, are the principal international standards governing NHRIs. They require NHRIs to have a broad mandate to promote and protect human rights, clearly set out in constitutional or legislative text. They also require independence, pluralism, adequate resources, cooperation with civil society and the ability to engage with international human rights mechanisms. The Paris Principles must not be reduced to technical accreditation language. They are the foundation of independent human rights protection.

46. In the present case, the Paris Principles are relevant because the executive measure affected the leadership, tenure and independence of Zimbabwe’s NHRI. A National Human Rights Institution cannot be considered genuinely independent if its Chairperson may be removed by unilateral executive action merely because the action is described as a “reassignment.” The independence of an NHRI must be effective in practice. It must protect the institution from both direct and indirect executive pressure.

47. The Court should therefore interpret the Constitution consistently with the Paris Principles by holding that any measure terminating or interrupting the Chairperson’s tenure in the ZHRC must comply with the constitutional safeguards applicable to removal.

X. THE SCA GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM THAT SECURITY OF TENURE IS CENTRAL TO NHRI INDEPENDENCE

48. The General Observations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation provide authoritative interpretive guidance on the Paris Principles. General Observation 2.1 on guarantee of tenure requires the legal framework of an NHRI to provide an independent and objective dismissal process.

49. It further requires that dismissal occur only in strict conformity with substantive and procedural requirements prescribed by law. It also protects members of the NHRI decision-making body from removal at the discretion of the appointing authority.

50. These requirements are directly relevant to the Chairperson of the ZHRC. A “reassignment” that terminates the Chairperson’s tenure in the ZHRC has the same effect on independence and security of tenure as removal. Such a measure cannot be placed outside the safeguards that govern removal merely because the executive calls it reassignment.

51. If the Respondent’s interpretation were accepted, security of tenure would become ineffective. The executive could remove NHRI leadership without proving misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, without a tribunal and without independent process. That interpretation is incompatible with the Paris Principles and the SCA’s guidance.

XI. THE PRESIDENT’S POSITION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH BOTH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PARIS PRINCIPLES

52. The Respondent’s position is not that the removal safeguards were complied with. The Respondent does not assert that an independent tribunal was appointed to review conduct of Ms. Majome. The Respondent does not assert that a tribunal recommended Ms. Majome’s removal. The Respondent does not assert that she was found guilty of gross misconduct, gross incompetence or incapacity. The Respondent does not assert that any independent process was followed.

53. Instead, the Respondent asserts that none of these safeguards was required because the measure was described as reassignment. This is precisely the type of executive circumvention that security of tenure is designed to prevent. The Constitution cannot be interpreted to allow its own safeguards to be defeated by terminology.

54. If the Constitution were interpreted to permit the President to move the Chairperson of the ZHRC out of office without triggering any independent removal process, such an interpretation would be incompatible with the Paris Principles, the SCA’s guidance on security of tenure and the requirement that NHRIs enjoy real and perceived independence.

55. The Court should therefore reject the Respondent’s interpretation and adopt an interpretation that preserves the effectiveness of sections 235 and 237.

XII. THE MATTER IS NOT A LABOUR DISPUTE

56. The Respondent’s suggestion that the matter is, in substance, a labour dispute is misconceived. The office of Chairperson of the ZHRC is not an ordinary employment post. It is a constitutionally protected office within an independent commission supporting democracy and within Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution.

57. The Applicant is not seeking to vindicate a private employment contract. He seeks to protect the constitutional independence of the ZHRC and the public interest in a Human Rights Commission capable of operating free from executive dictation.

58. Reinstatement in this context is not merely a labour remedy. It is the constitutional consequence of setting aside an unlawful executive measure that interrupted protected tenure. The relief sought restores constitutional compliance. It does not convert the dispute into a labour matter.

XIII. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL RESOLUTION 57/23 ON NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS

59. Human Rights Council resolution 57/23 on National Human Rights Institutions reaffirms the importance of independent and effective NHRIs in accordance with the Paris Principles. It recognises the important role of NHRIs in promoting and protecting human rights, strengthening participation, promoting the rule of law and contributing to the prevention of human rights violations. It also encourages greater efforts to investigate and respond to intimidation and reprisals against NHRIs, their members and staff. That concern is directly implicated in the present matter.

60. Ms. Majome was removed from the leadership of the ZHRC shortly after the Commission publicly reported on serious human rights concerns arising from the public hearings on the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill No. 3 of 2026. The timing and context raise a concern that the measure was retaliatory and that it sends a chilling message to other commissioners and oversight actors.

61. This Court should interpret the Constitution in a manner that protects the ZHRC from such interference.

XIV. THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

62. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by General Assembly resolution 53/144, protects individuals, groups and organs of society engaged in the promotion and protection of human rights.

63. Ms. Majome’s conduct through the ZHRC involved monitoring, reporting and defending human rights in a matter of significant public interest. Such conduct falls within protected human rights activity. A measure taken shortly after the ZHRC’s public reporting on alleged human rights violations raises serious concerns of reprisal.

64. The Constitution should not be interpreted in a way that enables retaliation against the leadership of an institution established to protect and promote human rights.

XV. ICCPR AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE GENERAL COMMENTS

65. Zimbabwe is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), to which it acceded on 13 May 1991. The Covenant is relevant to the present matter because the ZHRC’s public reporting on the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill No. 3 of 2026 concerned matters falling within the protection of the ICCPR, including freedom of expression, participation in public affairs, peaceful public engagement, equality, personal security and the right to an effective remedy.

66. The Applicant does not contend that this Honourable Court is being asked to decide an international complaint under the ICCPR. Rather, the ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments are relevant because they assist the Court in interpreting the Constitution in a manner that protects the substance of the rights and institutional safeguards at issue. Where the Constitution protects independent commissions, human rights monitoring, public participation and effective remedies, those protections should be interpreted consistently with Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations.

67. The present case arises because the ZHRC, under Ms. Majome’s leadership, publicly reported concerns regarding the conduct of constitutional public hearings. Those concerns included restrictions on participation, intimidation of dissenting voices, harassment, physical attacks and controlled participation. These are not ordinary administrative matters. They concern the ability of citizens to express views, participate in constitutional reform, assemble or engage publicly without intimidation, and obtain protection where rights are threatened.

68. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34 on article 19 of the ICCPR affirms the central importance of freedom of opinion and expression in a democratic society. Freedom of expression includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning public affairs, political processes and the conduct of public authorities. In the context of constitutional reform, public discussion, criticism, monitoring and reporting are at the core of protected expression.

69. The ZHRC’s public statement on the CAB 3 hearings was an institutional exercise of that protective function. It communicated human rights concerns to the public and to State institutions on a matter of national constitutional importance. A constitutional interpretation that permits the executive to remove or reassign the Chairperson of the ZHRC shortly after such reporting would weaken the protection of expression in public affairs and would create a chilling effect on future institutional reporting.

70. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25 on article 25 of the ICCPR affirms the right of citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs. Constitutional amendment processes are among the clearest examples of public affairs. Public hearings on constitutional reform must therefore be conducted in a manner that allows citizens to participate freely, meaningfully and without intimidation or exclusion.

71. The ZHRC’s role in monitoring and publicly reporting on the CAB 3 hearings was directly connected to the protection of meaningful public participation. If the leadership of the institution responsible for monitoring human rights in such a process can be removed after identifying violations, the right to participate in public affairs is weakened in practice. Citizens may participate formally, but the independent institution responsible for assessing whether participation is genuine may be deterred from speaking.

72. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 37 on article 21 of the ICCPR recognises the importance of peaceful assembly and public engagement as means through which individuals participate in shaping public affairs. Public hearings, consultations and collective civic participation are part of the democratic environment in which constitutional decisions are tested and debated. Allegations of intimidation, violence, exclusion or controlled participation during such processes raise issues that an independent human rights institution must be able to examine without fear of reprisal.

73. The ZHRC’s monitoring of the CAB 3 public hearings therefore concerned rights protected under articles 19, 21 and 25 of the ICCPR. The Court should approach the present matter on the basis that the Commission was not acting outside its mandate or entering partisan politics. It was performing its constitutional and human rights function by assessing whether a public constitutional process complied with basic standards of participation, expression, peaceful engagement and non-discrimination.

74. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 confirms that States must adopt legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures necessary to give effect to Covenant rights and must ensure effective remedies when those rights are violated. Effective protection of Covenant rights requires not only courts and formal legal remedies, but also independent institutions capable of monitoring, reporting, investigating and advising on human rights compliance.

75. The ZHRC is such an institution. It is part of the domestic framework through which Zimbabwe gives practical effect to its human rights obligations. If its Chairperson may be removed by executive action after the Commission reports on human rights concerns, the institutional capacity to provide independent monitoring and early warning is impaired. This weakens the domestic system of protection required for the effective implementation of Covenant rights.

76. The relevance of the ICCPR is therefore structural as well as individual. The issue is not only whether Ms. Majome personally suffered an adverse measure. The issue is whether the Constitution may be interpreted in a way that permits executive action capable of discouraging an independent human rights institution from reporting on alleged violations of rights protected under the Covenant.

77. A protective interpretation of the Constitution is required. Sections 235, 237 and 243 should be interpreted in a manner that preserves the independence of the ZHRC, protects the security of tenure of its Chairperson, and ensures that the Commission can monitor, report and speak publicly on rights-related concerns without fear of executive sanction. Such an interpretation is consistent with the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments, the Paris Principles and the constitutional purpose of independent commissions supporting democracy.

78. Executive action that penalises, or appears to penalise, the leadership of an NHRI after it reports on concerns affecting public participation and constitutional reform is inconsistent with the values protected by the ICCPR. It undermines freedom of expression, weakens meaningful participation in public affairs, chills peaceful civic engagement, and reduces the effectiveness of domestic remedies and oversight. For that reason, the ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments support the conclusion that the purported reassignment of Ms. Majome must be treated as unconstitutional and invalid.

XVI. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL RESOLUTION 51/33 AND DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION

79. Human Rights Council resolution 51/33 concerns national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up and is relevant to the present matter because it recognises the importance of effective domestic structures for implementing international human rights obligations and recommendations. Properly understood, such structures require both governmental coordination and independent oversight.

80. In this respect, the distinction between National Mechanisms for Implementation, Reporting and Follow-up and National Human Rights Institutions must be preserved. NMIRFs are governmental coordination structures. They assist the State in preparing reports, coordinating ministries, tracking recommendations and organising implementation. NHRIs, by contrast, must remain independent institutions of monitoring, investigation, public assessment and accountability. Their roles are complementary, but they are not interchangeable.

81. The Government may coordinate implementation, but the independent NHRI must be able to examine whether implementation is genuine, effective and rights-compliant. The State may report progress, but the NHRI must be able to identify gaps, omissions, risks and instances of non-implementation. This independent function is essential if international human rights recommendations are to move beyond diplomatic reporting and result in practical domestic protection.

82. The ZHRC, as Zimbabwe’s National Human Rights Institution, forms part of the domestic human rights protection architecture necessary for credible implementation, reporting, follow-up and constructive engagement with international human rights mechanisms. Its independence is therefore not collateral to Zimbabwe’s international human rights commitments. It is central to the State’s ability to demonstrate that those commitments are monitored, assessed and implemented in practice.

83. Presidential interference with the leadership of the ZHRC weakens not only the Commission itself, but also Zimbabwe’s broader domestic human rights protection system. If the Chairperson of the national institution responsible for independent monitoring, assessment and reporting can be removed by executive action after the institution has publicly raised human rights concerns, the credibility of domestic implementation and follow-up is seriously undermined.

84. The same reasoning applies to engagement with United Nations human rights mechanisms. Communications, urgent appeals, allegation letters, opinions of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and other outputs of international human rights mechanisms should not remain confined to diplomatic channels. Where appropriate, they should be capable of triggering independent examination by NHRIs and Ombudsman institutions, alongside governmental coordination through NMIRFs. Such independent review strengthens domestic accountability and gives practical effect to international human rights standards.

85. The harm arising from the presidential measure is therefore not limited to Ms. Majome personally. It affects the institutional capacity of the ZHRC to serve as an independent domestic monitor of Zimbabwe’s human rights obligations and commitments. It also weakens the independent pillar of the national system required for credible implementation, reporting and follow-up.

86. A constitutional interpretation that permits the executive to remove or reassign the Chairperson of the ZHRC outside the safeguards governing security of tenure would therefore be inconsistent not only with the constitutional protection of independent commissions and the Paris Principles, but also with the purpose of Human Rights Council resolution 51/33. It would undermine the independence of the institution best placed to assess whether Zimbabwe’s human rights obligations are being implemented in practice.

XVII. PUBLIC AND SYSTEMIC HARM

87. The measure challenged in this application caused harm beyond the individual situation of Ms. Majome. It affected the independence, credibility and effective functioning of the ZHRC. It undermined public confidence in independent commissions supporting democracy. It sent a coercive message to commissioners, oversight bodies and human rights defenders that independent reporting on politically sensitive human rights matters may lead to executive sanction.

88. This is the very chilling effect that constitutional tenure safeguards and the Paris Principles are designed to prevent. The real test of an NHRI is not merely its label or accreditation status, but whether it can protect people, speak independently, examine public power, engage with international mechanisms and contribute to democratic accountability.

89. If the Chairperson of such an institution can be removed after public reporting on human rights concerns, independence becomes conditional on executive tolerance. That is incompatible with the Constitution, the Paris Principles and the international human rights standards addressed above.

XVIII. APPROPRIATE RELIEF

90. The relief sought by the Applicant is necessary to restore constitutional compliance. It is appropriate for this Court to declare that the presidential measure of 10 April 2026 was unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it removed or purported to reassign Ms. Majome from the position of Chairperson of the ZHRC without compliance with the constitutional safeguards governing removal. It is further appropriate to set aside the measure.

91. Ms. Majome should be restored to the full and unhindered exercise of her functions, duties, powers and privileges as Chairperson of the ZHRC. The Respondent and any person acting on his behalf should be restrained from interfering with the functioning of the ZHRC or the tenure of its Chairperson or commissioners except in strict compliance with the Constitution.

92. Such relief is consistent with the Constitution, the Paris Principles and Zimbabwe’s international human rights obligations.

XIX. CONCLUSION

93. The Respondent’s position asks this Honourable Court to accept that a constitutionally protected office may be emptied of its safeguards by changing the label attached to executive action. That proposition is constitutionally unsustainable.

94. It is also incompatible with the Paris Principles and with the international standards governing independent National Human Rights Institutions. The ZHRC is an independent commission supporting democracy and Zimbabwe’s internationally recognised National Human Rights Institution.

95. Its Chairperson cannot be removed from that leadership role by executive reassignment, whether within Chapter 12 or outside it. Nor can a power relating to a non-Chapter 12 commission, including the Public Service Commission, be used to extinguish protected tenure in the ZHRC.

96. The alleged earlier transition of Ms. Majome into the ZHRC cannot create a continuing presidential power to move her out of the ZHRC. Once she assumed office as Chairperson of Zimbabwe’s NHRI, the constitutional and international guarantees of independence and security of tenure were fully engaged.

97. The purported reassignment of Ms. Majome to the Public Service Commission removed her from the protected leadership of the ZHRC without a tribunal, without lawful grounds, without any finding of misconduct, incompetence or incapacity, and without independent process.

98. This Honourable Court is respectfully urged to interpret the Constitution in a manner that protects the independence of Chapter 12 institutions, upholds Zimbabwe’s international human rights commitments, preserves compliance with the Paris Principles, and prevents executive circumvention of security-of-tenure safeguards.

99. The application should accordingly be granted.

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