HRC62 Side Event Calls for Scrutiny of U.S. Emergency Powers, Sanctions, Transnational Repression and Extraterritorial Accountability
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Geneva, 3 July 2026 - A side event held on the margins of the 62nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council called for urgent scrutiny of the United States’ use of emergency powers, sanctions, extraterritorial enforcement and non-cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms.
The event, entitled “Emergency Powers, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the United States: Article 4 of the ICCPR, Transnational Repression and Extraterritorial Accountability,” took place in Room XI at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. It was organized by Public Organization “Public Advocacy,” an NGO in special consultative status with ECOSOC, in collaboration with Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTi).
The event brought together Professor George Katrougalos, United Nations Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Professor Attiya Waris, United Nations Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights; Mr. Abdelwahab Hani, former member of the UN Committee against Torture, APT Board Member and CTI Special Advisor; Mr. Stefan G. Ziegler, humanitarian practitioner, Associate Professor and filmmaker; Ms. Merna Shalash, President of Partners for Transparency; and Mr. Sharof Azizov, Executive Director of JPTi. The event was moderated by Ms. Matilde Pacheco, Human Rights Officer at JPTi.
Opening the discussion, Sharof Azizov stated that the issue is no longer one of political disagreement or procedural excuses. It is a question of accountability. “This discussion is not intended to politicize scrutiny of the United States. It is intended to defend the universality of international human rights law,” he said. “Powerful States must be held to the same standards that they invoke in relation to others.”
JPTi emphasized that the United States and the President of the United States must be accountable to the international community for the continuing non-implementation of Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 operate under the domestic standard of an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” which does not correspond to the ICCPR threshold of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
The event stressed that emergency powers cannot become a permanent architecture of executive rule. As Sharof Azizov stated, “Emergency powers must not become permanent instruments of executive rule. National security must not become legal immunity. Executive discretion must not replace law, evidence, courts and accountability.”
Participants examined how U.S. emergency powers may affect individuals, institutions, companies, entrepreneurs, religious communities, civil society actors, media structures, public officials and international officials beyond U.S. territory. The event addressed sanctions, financial exclusion, asset freezes, travel bans, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics designations, migration measures, surveillance, criminal cooperation, use of force and other forms of extraterritorial enforcement.
The discussion also focused on U.S. transnational repression. Referring to the OHCHR Civic Space Brief, JPTi recalled that transnational repression may include acts conducted or directed by a State, or by its proxies, to deter, silence or punish dissent, criticism or human rights advocacy expressed from outside its territory. The event examined how sanctions, watchlists, financial exclusion, smear campaigns, digital threats, terrorist labels, foreign-mission restrictions and barriers to travel, banking, funding, registration, work and advocacy may become tools of transnational repression when used without legality, necessity, proportionality, independent review and effective remedy.
The event gave particular attention to U.S. sanctions against the International Criminal Court, including sanctions affecting ICC officials in connection with investigations concerning U.S. and Israeli nationals, as well as sanctions affecting UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese and Palestinian human rights organizations cooperating with the ICC. Speakers warned that sanctions are no longer only foreign policy instruments; they may become instruments of pressure against international justice, independent experts and civil society.
Ms. Merna Shalash stated that “emergency powers cannot be treated as a purely domestic matter when they produce extraterritorial human rights consequences.” She called for stronger judicial oversight, parliamentary scrutiny, transparency and effective remedies for persons affected by U.S. measures with extraterritorial effects.
The event also addressed the most extreme forms of extraterritorial coercion, including kidnapping, enforced disappearance, rendition, extrajudicial killing, threats or use of force, and actions designed to compel changes in political trajectory, force defections, weaken State institutions, pressure senior officials to abandon their positions, or contribute to regime change. JPTi warned that such practices raise serious questions under the UN Charter, international human rights law and the prohibition of arbitrary interference in sovereign political processes.
Mr. Abdelwahab Hani recalled the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. “Public emergency is not a legal exception to human dignity. National security is not a justification for torture. Executive power is not a substitute for legality,” he stated. He emphasized that no exceptional circumstances, including war, threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify torture.
Professor George Katrougalos placed the discussion within the broader transformation of the international legal order. He warned that the expansion of emergency powers, unilateral sanctions, executive discretion and extraterritorial domestic legislation reflect a deeper structural shift. He called for “embedded multipolarity,” in which power remains anchored in common institutions, multilateral procedures and universal legal principles, with the UN Charter at its core. “No State, no matter how powerful, should be permitted to remove itself from review,” he said. “The emerging world must not be governed by raw power or by the principle that might makes right. It must be governed by the strength of international law.”
Professor Attiya Waris highlighted the fiscal and financial dimensions of unilateral coercive measures. “Financial systems are not neutral,” she said. “They can be used to shape political outcomes, influence the conduct of States, restrict institutions, and affect individuals and communities across borders.” She addressed the role of the U.S. dollar, New York-based clearing systems, credit rating agencies, investor responsibility, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence as areas where financial and technological power may create human rights consequences beyond national borders.
The event also addressed media restrictions and public communication structures. Participants noted that Russian state broadcasters, Iranian broadcasting structures and Chinese state media have been subjected to sanctions or restrictive measures, including foreign-mission restrictions in the United States. The long-standing U.S. sanctions and embargo framework against Cuba was also discussed as an example of coercive measures becoming normalized over decades, with consequences for private economic actors, financial channels, humanitarian exchanges, civil society, religious communities and ordinary people.
Speakers raised concern about entrepreneurs and business actors affected by sanctions. JPTi stressed that business activity, nationality, market presence, family association or perceived proximity to public authorities must never substitute for proof of concrete unlawful conduct. When sanctions freeze assets, block transactions, destroy companies, prevent travel, cut access to banking or make lawful business impossible without review and remedy, they may become economic punishment without due process.
The event called for the Working Group on Business and Human Rights and the ongoing negotiations on the legally binding instrument on business and human rights to address transnational repression and sanctions-related over-compliance. Participants stressed that coercive economic measures can operate through banks, payment systems, insurers, logistics companies, platforms, investors, compliance mechanisms, sanctions screening and reputational blacklisting. These measures can destroy companies, block lawful trade, weaken small and medium-sized enterprises, deprive communities of livelihoods and undermine the Sustainable Development Goal of ending poverty.
Mr. Stefan G. Ziegler connected the discussion to his films BROKEN: A Palestinian Journey Through International Law and The Mandate: For Whom International Law Matters. He reflected on the gap between international law as declared and international law as implemented. “International law matters only if it is respected when it restrains power,” he said. He emphasized that emergency powers, sanctions against international courts or UN experts, and executive discretion are not only domestic legal questions, but questions about the future of the international legal order itself.
JPTi also warned against selective campaigns targeting independent UN experts. Criticism of mandate-holders is legitimate when factual, proportionate and made in good faith. However, when reputational campaigns are linked to calls for State sanctions, visa restrictions, loss of immunity, asset freezes or other coercive measures, they may move beyond ordinary advocacy. In at least one case, an ECOSOC-accredited NGO publicly campaigned for sanctions and visa denial against a UN Special Rapporteur, addressed its request to United States authorities, and later presented the resulting U.S. sanctions as the outcome of its campaign.
JPTi stated that when such campaigns are operationalized through executive orders, sanctions, visa restrictions or other State coercive powers, they may become part of the architecture of transnational repression. The chilling effect is clear: criticism of the United States, Israel or their allies may result not only in public attacks, but also in travel bans, financial restrictions, reputational destruction and legal exposure. This threatens the independence of the UN human rights system.
The event further addressed the international religious freedom dimension. While the protection of freedom of religion or belief remains a legitimate and important human rights objective, JPTi warned that emergency powers and sanctions must not become selective political instruments or create collective punishment, discrimination, financial exclusion or geopolitical pressure without remedy.
JPTi called for the mandate on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights to be strengthened so that it expressly includes the human rights impact of transnational repression when coercive measures are used extraterritorially to silence, intimidate, punish or disable civil society, journalists, religious actors, entrepreneurs, mandate-holders, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, international officials and human rights defenders.
The event concluded with a call on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to demonstrate visible and sustained leadership on unfettered U.S. emergency powers, sanctions, due process, international justice, civil society, media, entrepreneurs, mandate-holders, religious communities and the credibility of the UN human rights system.
JPTi also urged that the United States’ rescheduled Universal Periodic Review during UPR53 in November 2026 proceed on the basis of universality, equality and non-selectivity. The issue is no longer whether the United States can offer excuses for non-cooperation with the Human Rights Council or the UPR. The issue is whether the United States, including the President of the United States as the authority directing the executive use of emergency powers, will be held accountable to the international community.
No State, however powerful, should be allowed to remove itself from review through non-participation, obstruction or political pressure. If the United States does not cooperate, the review must still proceed on the basis of available UN information and stakeholder submissions.
JPTi’s key recommendations include bringing the U.S. emergency framework into conformity with Article 4 of the ICCPR; submitting Article 4 notifications where required; imposing strict time limits on emergency declarations; ensuring legislative and judicial review; guaranteeing due process and effective remedies; and preventing emergency powers from being used to justify arbitrary sanctions, deprivation of property, religious discrimination, forced return, enforced disappearance, kidnapping, extrajudicial killing, coercive regime-change pressure, transnational repression, sanctions-related over-compliance, financial exclusion or punishment without accountability.
END
Full statements below and available for download
Opening Statement by Sharof Azizov, Executive Director of JPTi
Excellencies, distinguished guests, colleagues and friends,
Good morning, and thank you for joining us.
It is my pleasure to open this side event on “Emergency Powers, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the United States: Article 4 of the ICCPR, Transnational Repression and Extraterritorial Accountability.” I thank Public Organization “Public Advocacy” for supporting this event, our distinguished speakers, Permanent Missions, United Nations experts, civil society organizations, legal practitioners and all colleagues present.
This discussion is not intended to politicize scrutiny of the United States. It is intended to defend the universality of international human rights law. Powerful States must be held to the same standards that they invoke in relation to others. The credibility of the Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review, treaty bodies and Special Procedures depends on equal and non-selective application of human rights standards.
Our starting point is Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 4 permits derogation only in exceptional circumstances: where there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, where the emergency is officially proclaimed, where measures are strictly required, and where the State notifies the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The concern is that the United States’ emergency framework does not fully reflect these requirements. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 operate under domestic standards, including the concept of an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” That is not the same as the ICCPR threshold of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
This gap has serious consequences. Emergency powers may be renewed for years and may affect individuals, institutions, companies, entrepreneurs, religious communities, civil society actors, media structures, public officials and international officials far beyond United States territory. They may operate through sanctions, financial exclusion, asset freezes, travel bans, migration measures, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics designations, surveillance, criminal cooperation, use of force and other forms of extraterritorial enforcement.
For today’s discussion, I refer to the OHCHR Civic Space Brief on transnational repression. OHCHR describes transnational repression as acts conducted or directed by a State, or by its proxies, to deter, silence or punish dissent, criticism or human rights advocacy expressed from outside its territory. It also recognizes that non-State actors, including private companies, technology firms, criminal networks, militias, paramilitary groups and media organizations, may play a role when acting at the request, or with the acquiescence, of the repressing State.
This definition matters because transnational repression is not limited to physical attacks. It may also operate through digital threats, smear campaigns, misuse of extradition procedures, INTERPOL notices, terrorist labels, watchlists, sanctions lists, financial exclusion, proxy punishment and barriers to travel, banking, funding, registration, work and advocacy.
Sanctions should therefore not be artificially separated from other forms of transnational coercion. Targeted financial exclusion, travel bans, asset freezes, foreign-mission restrictions, abductions, renditions, threats or use of force, and targeted killings may operate on the same spectrum when they are used to punish, intimidate, disable or coerce individuals and institutions beyond borders. Without lawful basis, evidence, necessity, proportionality, independent review and effective remedy, such measures may become forms of transnational repression.
This is no longer theoretical. The United States has used emergency sanctions against the International Criminal Court, including its Prosecutor, judges and deputy prosecutors, because of ICC action concerning U.S. and Israeli nationals. It has sanctioned UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese in connection with her work on accountability in the occupied Palestinian territory. Palestinian human rights organizations cooperating with the ICC have also been targeted. These examples show how sanctions may move from foreign policy into pressure against international justice, independent experts and civil society.
The same logic can reach media and information structures. Russian state broadcasters, including Channel One Russia, Russia-1, NTV, RT and Rossiya Segodnya, have been targeted through sanctions or related measures. Iranian broadcasting structures and individual media officials have also been sanctioned. Chinese state media, including Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio International, China Daily, China Central Television, China News Service, People’s Daily and Global Times, have been subjected to foreign-mission restrictions in the United States. These measures differ legally, but they show that national-security tools can reach public communication institutions, not only military or intelligence actors.
Cuba remains another important example. The long-standing U.S. sanctions and embargo framework against Cuba shows how coercive measures may become normalized over decades and affect not only State authorities, but also private economic actors, financial channels, humanitarian exchanges, civil society, religious communities and ordinary people. Whatever the policy objective, such measures must be assessed against necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, due process and effective remedy.
Entrepreneurs also deserve attention. Sanctions often affect business leaders, investors, founders, companies, banks, logistics networks, technology providers and small or medium-sized enterprises. Business activity, nationality, market presence, family association or perceived proximity to public authorities must never substitute for proof of concrete unlawful conduct. When sanctions freeze assets, block transactions, destroy companies, prevent travel, cut access to banking or make lawful business impossible without review and remedy, they may become economic punishment without due process.
This should also be addressed by the Working Group on Business and Human Rights and in the ongoing negotiations on the legally binding instrument on business and human rights. Transnational repression can operate through banks, payment systems, insurers, logistics companies, platforms, investors, compliance mechanisms, sanctions screening and reputational blacklisting. It can destroy companies, block lawful trade, weaken small and medium-sized enterprises and deprive communities of livelihoods. It therefore undermines sustainable development, including the Sustainable Development Goal of ending poverty.
We must also address the most extreme forms of extraterritorial coercion: kidnapping, enforced disappearance, rendition, extrajudicial killing, threats or use of force, and actions designed to compel changes in political trajectory, force defections, weaken State institutions, pressure senior officials to abandon their positions, or contribute to regime change. Such practices raise serious questions under the UN Charter, international human rights law and the prohibition of arbitrary interference in sovereign political processes.
A related concern is the growing practice of selective campaigns against independent UN experts. Criticism of mandate-holders is legitimate when factual, proportionate and made in good faith. But when reputational campaigns are linked to calls for State sanctions, visa restrictions, loss of immunity, asset freezes or other coercive measures, they may move beyond ordinary advocacy. In at least one case, an ECOSOC-accredited NGO publicly campaigned for sanctions and visa denial against a UN Special Rapporteur, addressed its request to United States authorities, and later presented the resulting U.S. sanctions as the outcome of its campaign. In a broader report, the same organization targeted thirteen Special Procedures mandate-holders and recommended restrictive measures against them.
When such campaigns are operationalized through executive orders, sanctions, visa restrictions or other State coercive powers, they may become part of the architecture of transnational repression. The chilling effect is clear: criticism of the United States, Israel or their allies may result not only in public attacks, but also in travel bans, financial restrictions, reputational destruction and legal exposure. This threatens the independence of the UN human rights system.
International religious freedom must also be part of this discussion. The United States has developed a powerful international religious freedom architecture, including annual reporting, Countries of Particular Concern, Special Watch Lists, Entities of Particular Concern, visa restrictions and targeted sanctions. However, even when the stated purpose is to defend freedom of religion or belief, emergency powers and sanctions must not become selective political instruments. They must protect victims and communities, not create collective punishment, discrimination, financial exclusion or geopolitical pressure without remedy.
We are therefore concerned about the normalization of emergency governance. Emergency powers must not become permanent instruments of executive rule. National security must not become legal immunity. Executive discretion must not replace law, evidence, courts and accountability.
For this reason, the mandate on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures should be strengthened to include the human rights impact of transnational repression when coercive measures are used extraterritorially to silence, intimidate, punish or disable civil society, journalists, religious actors, entrepreneurs, mandate-holders, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, international officials and human rights defenders.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights must also demonstrate visible and sustained leadership. The problem of unfettered emergency powers of the President of the United States cannot be treated as technical or secondary. It affects sanctions, international justice, civil society, media, entrepreneurs, mandate-holders, religious communities, due process and the credibility of the UN human rights system. The High Commissioner should address this issue clearly and relentlessly, including in relation to United States cooperation with the Human Rights Council and the UPR.
This event is also connected to the United States’ rescheduled Universal Periodic Review during UPR53 in November 2026. The UPR is universal, equal, cooperative and non-selective. No State should be allowed to remove itself from review through non-participation, obstruction or political pressure. If a State does not cooperate, the review should still proceed on the basis of available UN information and stakeholder submissions.
Our objective is practical: to support recommendations calling on the United States to bring its emergency framework into conformity with Article 4 of the ICCPR; submit Article 4 notifications where required; impose strict time limits on emergency declarations; ensure legislative and judicial review; guarantee due process and effective remedies; and prevent emergency powers from being used to justify arbitrary sanctions, deprivation of property, religious discrimination, forced return, enforced disappearance, kidnapping, extrajudicial killing, coercive regime-change pressure, transnational repression, sanctions-related over-compliance, financial exclusion or punishment without accountability.
With this, I warmly welcome all participants and look forward to an open and constructive discussion.
Thank you.
Intervention by Professor George Katrougalos, United Nations Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order
Madam Chair, Excellencies, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,
Today’s subject may appear, at first sight, to concern a domestic constitutional issue: the growing use of emergency powers in the United States. In reality, however, it concerns something much larger: the transformation of the international legal order itself.
For almost 80 years, the post-war international system rested on a paradox. The United States was both the principal architect of the multilateral order and its most powerful actor. This arrangement was never free from contradictions, but it nevertheless produced institutions, norms and procedures.
Today, that historical equilibrium is disappearing. The United States is increasingly becoming a principal detractor of the United Nations system. During his confirmation process before the Senate, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated not only that the current international order is obsolete, but also that it has become a weapon used against the United States.
The expansion of emergency powers, the routine use of unilateral sanctions, the growing reliance on executive discretion, and the extraterritorial projection of domestic legislation are symptoms of a deeper structural change: the erosion of American unipolar hegemony and the difficult transition toward a genuinely multipolar world.
It is now obvious that the short American unipolar moment is over. Marco Rubio himself described that moment as a “historical anomaly.” We are now in a multipolar world. The real question is: what kind of multipolarity will emerge?
There are at least three possibilities.
The first is competitive and fragmented multipolarity: a world divided into isolated economic spheres of influence or civilizational blocs, where international law becomes merely an instrument of geopolitical rivalry.
The second is a renewed bipolarity between the United States and China. However, despite the rhetoric surrounding decoupling, highly integrated global value chains make total economic bifurcation impossible without prohibitive costs. It is true that the era of neoliberal hyper-globalization is over, but de-risking has not broken the structural interdependence of the global economy. What we are seeing is not a world divided into two hermetically sealed blocs, but a fluid, polycentric international system. The diplomatic agency of the Global South confirms this. Many States explicitly reject any new duopoly through strategies of active non-alignment, diversified partnerships, diversified financing and strategic autonomy.
The third alternative, and in my view the only sustainable one, is what I have called in my recent report embedded multipolarity. Unlike nineteenth-century balance-of-power politics, embedded multipolarity means that power must remain embedded within common institutions, multilateral procedures and universal legal principles, with the United Nations Charter at its core.
Multipolarity is a political and sociological fact. Embedded multipolarity is a constitutional project.
This brings us directly to why developments within the domestic constitutional framework of the United States require rigorous attention. Legislation such as the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act has gradually become the permanent legal infrastructure for an expanding range of executive measures affecting millions of people across the globe.
The domestic statutory threshold for declaring an emergency, based on the broad and loose standard of an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” has become detached from the strict and exceptional threshold established by Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
When temporary emergency powers are normalized into permanent governance, executive discretion replaces ordinary legality.
We see this vividly in recent developments within the constitutional order of the United States. Judicial challenges to executive tariffs show the importance of limiting unilateral presidential authority. At the same time, judicial oversight and effective remedies are increasingly threatened where national security, foreign policy and emergency powers are invoked. Legislative initiatives such as the No Rogue Rulings Act represent a regressive development from the perspective of international human rights standards.
We also see the rise of militarized paradigms of transnational coercion. Administrative emergency powers cannot lawfully become a substitute for armed conflict authority or a justification for extraterritorial killings. United Nations experts have repeatedly warned against lethal operations against vessels at sea in the Caribbean and the Pacific, where questions arise under international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law on the use of force.
We see similar accountability gaps in other areas. Recent discussions concerning possible legal immunity for international governance arrangements in Gaza show the continuing temptation to place political arrangements beyond ordinary legal accountability. This adds to the broader problem of bypassing both domestic and international legality.
The same concern appears in the field of unilateral coercive measures. Measures such as the severe blockade affecting Cuba, the coercive pressure on Venezuela and related threats or uses of force do not satisfy the threshold established by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. They seek to replace collective international decision-making with unilateral discretion.
We must resist this trend. We must defend international legality and protect the United Nations legal ecosystem.
The forthcoming Universal Periodic Review of the United States offers a vital institutional test. The UPR is a cooperative and non-selective mechanism. No State, no matter how powerful, should be permitted to remove itself from review.
Recommendations calling on the United States to bring its National Emergencies Act and related emergency legislation into strict conformity with Article 4 of the ICCPR are not merely criticisms directed at one country. They are foundational assertions of legal discipline, necessary to protect every society from the permanent normalization of emergency governance.
The emerging world must not be governed by raw power or by the principle that might makes right. It must be governed by the strength of international law.
Thank you for your attention.
Intervention by Professor Attiya Waris, United Nations Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rightsProfessor of Fiscal Law and Policy, University of Nairobi
Hello, my name is Attiya Waris. I am the United Nations Independent Expert on foreign debt and other international financial obligations and their implications for human rights. I am also a Professor at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, where I specialize in fiscal law and policy.
It is my pleasure and honour to speak to you today. Unfortunately, I could not be present in person, but I very much wanted to contribute to this important conversation.
I will make a few brief comments, focusing on the connection between finance, fiscal transactions, fiscal systems, politics and power. My central point is that financial systems are not neutral. They can be used to shape political outcomes, influence the conduct of States, restrict institutions, and affect individuals and communities across borders. I will therefore draw on examples from different parts of the world, particularly from a fiscal and financial perspective.
Let me begin with sanctions and unilateral coercive measures. In my understanding, sanctions are measures that are lawfully adopted through the United Nations Security Council. Any other unilateral action taken by one State, or by a group of States, to coerce another State, institution or individual to act in a particular way because another State or region is dissatisfied with its conduct, falls within the category of unilateral coercive measures. I have written on this issue before, and I use this simplified distinction for the purpose of today’s discussion.
The question then becomes: how do States use fiscal and financial systems to implement unilateral coercive measures?
One of the main mechanisms is control over currency and payment systems. In the case of the United States, this involves the role of the U.S. dollar as a globally dominant currency and the clearing systems connected to New York. In the case of Europe, similar questions arise in relation to the euro and the financial infrastructure connected to the European Union and European institutions. These systems allow States and regions to exercise significant control over international financial transactions.
This raises important questions. How is this control exercised? Why is it exercised in this way? And why have we allowed it to expand to the point where it may become oppressive?
A major challenge for many countries and individuals around the world is that the U.S. dollar remains a globally transactional and hard currency. This has been the case for a long time. However, when such a currency is used for political purposes, the consequences can be severe. Some countries may be unable to fulfil their financial commitments. Some may be unable to pay their debts. Others may be unable to receive payment for trade. Others may even be prevented from paying their membership contributions to international organizations.
For example, I wrote to the Government of the United States requesting the release of funds so that countries such as Afghanistan could pay their membership dues to the United Nations. The United Nations is already facing a serious liquidity crisis. In this context, it is especially concerning when States are not able to meet their membership obligations because their own financial resources are blocked or controlled through foreign currency systems.
This is one part of the problem.
A second issue concerns credit rating agencies. The dominant global credit rating agencies are private entities, and they are based in the United States. At the same time, there is currently an effort within the African Union to develop a public credit rating agency for the African continent.
This is an important development, because credit rating agencies exercise enormous influence. They assess whether a country is able to repay its debts, whether it is considered creditworthy, and whether investors should regard it as a safe or risky destination. In more corporate terms, they assess whether a country’s collateral is considered good enough.
This raises serious concerns. How do these agencies access and assess data? Who has oversight over their methodologies? How transparent are their decisions? Researchers and affected States often have limited ability to scrutinize the data and assumptions behind ratings. Yet the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and private investors frequently rely on these ratings when making decisions about lending, investment and financing.
This is an extremely heavy responsibility. The question is whether such responsibility should rest primarily in private hands, concentrated in one country.
This brings me to the issue of investors and investor responsibility. Many high-net-worth individuals either live in New York, invest through entities based in New York, or use financial structures connected to the United States. A few years ago, a bill was introduced in the New York State Senate addressing the human rights responsibilities of high-net-worth individuals and investors in relation to their investments in developing countries. That bill is still being debated.
In my view, it is important that this issue be taken forward. If global finance is moving through one particular country, then we are not dealing only with governmental power. We are also dealing with the power of capital. Understanding and unpacking that power is essential for any serious discussion of unilateral coercive measures, fiscal justice and human rights.
Finally, I would like to raise the issue of digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence. Control over data and information is becoming increasingly sensitive and contested. Who controls data, how it is controlled, and from where it is controlled are now major human rights questions.
Many of the world’s digital servers and major digital infrastructures remain connected to the United States. This means that data access is not only a challenge for developing countries, but for countries across the world. As artificial intelligence expands, these questions will become even more important. Financial systems, data systems and digital infrastructures are now deeply interconnected, and they can all become tools of influence, pressure and control.
I am sure that your event will address many additional issues, some of which may go beyond my own main area of work, namely fiscal and financial systems. But I hope these reflections help to show why emergency powers, unilateral coercive measures, financial control, debt, investment, credit ratings, digital infrastructure and human rights must be discussed together.
I look forward to following the conversation.
Thank you very much.
Intervention by Mr. Abdelwahab Hani, Former Member of the UN Committee against Torture, APT Board Member and CTI Special Advisor
A UN-CAT Perspective
Madam Moderator, Excellencies, distinguished colleagues and friends,
It is a pleasure to join this important side event on U.S. emergency powers and the ICCPR, organized on the margins of the 62nd session of the Human Rights Council.
I will approach the issue from the perspective of the Convention against Torture, the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and the broader United Nations human rights system.
The starting point is the Charter of the United Nations. Article 55 of the Charter recalls that the United Nations shall promote conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based on equal rights and self-determination of peoples. It also calls for higher standards of living, economic and social progress, solutions to international social and health problems, and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction.
This is important because emergency powers, sanctions, counter-terrorism measures, migration control, military operations and extraterritorial enforcement cannot be assessed only as matters of national policy. They must also be assessed in light of the purposes of the United Nations and the international obligation to promote human dignity, equality, development and human rights.
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is one of the clearest expressions of this universal commitment. It appears in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3.
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This right is non-derogable. Even in times of emergency, it cannot be suspended.
The Convention against Torture is even more explicit. Article 2 states that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war, a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. It also states that an order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification.
This language is very important for today’s discussion. Emergency powers may be invoked by States for national security, counter-terrorism, migration control, sanctions enforcement, military operations or intelligence cooperation. But none of these grounds can justify torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, secret detention, coercive interrogation, unlawful transfer, refoulement, or denial of basic safeguards.
The prohibition is absolute. It is not subject to balancing. It is not subject to political convenience. It is not weakened by national security language.
The Committee against Torture has also emphasized, in General Comment No. 2, that the prohibition of torture has become a peremptory norm of international law. It is a jus cogens norm. This means that it belongs to the highest level of international legal obligations.
The obligation to prevent torture is also wide-ranging. It is not limited to criminalization after the fact. It includes prevention, training, legal safeguards, review of detention legislation, review of interrogation methods, investigation, prosecution, extradition where appropriate, redress, rehabilitation, protection, non-refoulement and the exclusion of evidence obtained through torture.
Article 16 of the Convention also requires States to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee has repeatedly explained that the obligations to prevent torture and ill-treatment are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. In practice, the line between torture and ill-treatment is often not clear. Conditions that give rise to ill-treatment may facilitate torture. Therefore, measures required to prevent torture must also be applied to prevent ill-treatment.
This is directly relevant to extraterritorial practices. Secret detention, extraordinary rendition, transfer to places where a person faces a risk of torture, prolonged incommunicado detention, coercive interrogation, deprivation of due process, and exposure to violence or abuse by partner forces may all raise serious questions under the Convention against Torture and the ICCPR.
No State may avoid responsibility simply by acting outside its territory, by relying on another State, by using intelligence cooperation, or by framing the measure as an emergency, security or counter-terrorism action. Where a State exercises power, control, direction, influence or decisive involvement, accountability questions arise.
Non-refoulement is particularly important. Under the Convention against Torture, a State must not expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. This obligation applies regardless of the person’s status, allegations against them, or the political sensitivity of the case.
Emergency powers also raise questions of review and remedy. The Convention against Torture requires effective prevention, complaint mechanisms, investigation and redress. Victims must have access to justice. Allegations must be investigated promptly, impartially and effectively. Remedies must not be theoretical. They must be practical and accessible.
From the perspective of the treaty body system, States remain under reporting and review obligations. Initial reports, periodic reports, simplified reporting procedures, individual communications, inter-State communications, inquiries, general comments and follow-up procedures all form part of the system of accountability. Review may take place with the participation of the State, online, in person, and in certain circumstances even without the full cooperation of the State concerned.
This is also relevant to the Universal Periodic Review. No State should be able to avoid scrutiny by invoking political objections, non-participation or exceptionalism. The universality of human rights review is central to the credibility of the system.
In the context of U.S. emergency powers, the main question is therefore not only whether measures are authorized by domestic law. The deeper question is whether they comply with non-derogable international obligations, including Article 7 of the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture.
Emergency powers must never become a legal space where ordinary safeguards disappear. They must not be used to justify torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, unlawful transfer, denial of judicial guarantees, extrajudicial killing, or impunity for serious violations.
The same applies to extraterritorial operations. Military, intelligence, security, migration and counter-terrorism measures conducted outside national territory must remain subject to international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.
My main recommendation is therefore clear: any review of U.S. emergency powers under Article 4 of the ICCPR should also fully integrate the obligations arising under Article 7 of the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture. This includes the obligation to prevent torture and ill-treatment, ensure non-refoulement, provide safeguards against abuse, investigate violations, prosecute or extradite where required, exclude evidence obtained by torture, and guarantee redress and rehabilitation for victims.
In conclusion, public emergency is not a legal exception to human dignity. National security is not a justification for torture. Executive power is not a substitute for legality. The absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment remains binding at all times, in all places, and in all circumstances.
Thank you for your attention.
Intervention by Ms. Merna Shalash, President of Partners for Transparency
Extraterritorial Accountability for U.S. Practices: Accountability Gaps and Prospects for Reform
Distinguished participants, colleagues and friends,
It is a pleasure to contribute to this important discussion on U.S. emergency powers, the ICCPR and extraterritorial accountability.
The use of emergency powers by the United States has increasingly produced effects beyond its national territory. This raises serious questions under international human rights law, particularly where measures adopted under domestic emergency legislation affect individuals, institutions and entities outside the direct territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
This issue is especially important because U.S. emergency powers have been used to support a wide range of coercive extraterritorial measures. These include economic and financial sanctions, counter-terrorism measures, restrictions on international financial transactions, maritime operations, military action, and other measures that may be implemented outside the United States or may affect persons and entities abroad.
In such circumstances, the question is not only whether these measures are lawful under U.S. domestic law. The question is also whether they comply with the United States’ obligations under international human rights law, including the ICCPR. Where extraterritorial measures interfere with rights, cause harm, or restrict access to justice and remedies, accountability must follow.
One of the clearest examples concerns sanctions targeting the International Criminal Court. In 2020, the U.S. Administration issued Executive Order 13928, which authorized sanctions against ICC officials involved in investigations concerning alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan. These sanctions targeted former ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and another senior Court official. Although that Executive Order was revoked in 2021, the United States later returned to a similar approach through Executive Order 14203, which was used in 2025 to impose sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan in connection with investigations relating to the situation in Palestine.
These measures have drawn strong concern from the United Nations, human rights organizations and defenders of international justice. They raise fundamental questions about the use of emergency powers to pressure an independent international court and to deter accountability for serious international crimes.
A similar concern arises from the use of extraterritorial economic and administrative measures against the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese. Sanctions imposed against her following her work on the occupied Palestinian territory created financial and administrative consequences that affected her ability to carry out her international mandate. This raises serious questions about the compatibility of such measures with the independence of UN mandate-holders and with the United States’ obligations under international human rights law.
The use of force outside national borders also requires scrutiny. The United States has continued to conduct military operations and air strikes in countries such as Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Somalia, often justified by reference to counter-terrorism and national security. UN Special Rapporteurs and human rights bodies have repeatedly called for independent investigations into whether such operations comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly where lethal force is used outside active battlefields or without adequate transparency and accountability.
These examples demonstrate the urgent need to strengthen accountability for U.S. measures with extraterritorial effects. Such measures must be subject to judicial oversight, parliamentary scrutiny, transparency and effective remedies for those affected. This is consistent with the obligations of the United States under the ICCPR and other relevant international instruments.
At present, however, accountability faces serious legal and practical obstacles. On the one hand, the executive branch enjoys broad powers to declare national emergencies, impose sanctions and adopt exceptional measures under the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Many of these measures are subject to limited review within the U.S. legal system, especially when national security or foreign policy is invoked.
On the other hand, individuals and entities affected outside the United States often face major barriers in challenging decisions that interfere with their rights. They may lack access to U.S. courts, information about the evidence against them, meaningful procedural guarantees, or an effective opportunity to contest sanctions, designations, restrictions or other coercive measures. The narrow scope of judicial review in matters linked to national security and foreign policy further limits accountability and restricts access to compensation or other forms of reparation.
In this context, the right to an effective remedy is essential. Extraterritorial accountability requires legal mechanisms that allow affected persons to challenge measures interfering with their rights, obtain independent and impartial review, and receive reparation where violations are established.
Addressing these accountability gaps requires more than isolated policy changes. It requires a comprehensive review of the legal framework governing the use of emergency powers, especially where such powers produce extraterritorial effects. All such measures must comply with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. They must also be subject to effective judicial and parliamentary oversight.
I would therefore make three recommendations.
First, effective remedies must be provided for all persons affected by U.S. measures with extraterritorial effects. This includes the right to challenge sanctions-list designations, access to independent review, disclosure of sufficient reasons and evidence, and reparation where violations are established.
Second, all military and security operations conducted by the United States outside its borders must comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Allegations of unlawful lethal force, arbitrary deprivation of life, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment or other serious violations must be subject to independent and transparent investigation, and responsible officials must be held accountable.
Third, Member States of the Human Rights Council should raise the issues of transnational repression and extraterritorial accountability during the Universal Periodic Review of the United States in 2026. They should submit recommendations calling on the United States to align its emergency legislation and practice with its obligations under the ICCPR and other relevant international human rights instruments.
In conclusion, emergency powers cannot be treated as a purely domestic matter when they produce extraterritorial human rights consequences. The use of sanctions, financial restrictions, counter-terrorism measures, military operations and administrative coercion beyond national borders must remain subject to law, oversight, accountability and remedy. No State should be permitted to use emergency powers to escape its international human rights obligations.
Thank you.
Intervention by Mr. Stefan G. Ziegler, Humanitarian practitioner, Associate Professor and filmmaker
My work as documentary filmmaker has been guided by one central question: what happens when international law promises protection, but power refuses to implement it? In BROKEN: A Palestinian Journey Through International Law (2018/52’), we examined the gap between the law as declared and the law as lived. The film focused on the Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, the 2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, and the failure of the international community to give real effect to legal obligations that were clearly identified. For me, international law’s promises are not broken because it inherently has no value, but because States invoke it selectively, respect it rhetorically, and abandon it when implementation becomes politically inconvenient.
In The Mandate: For Whom International Law Matters (2025/62’), I tried to take this question further. The film is not only about one conflict, one court, or one legal opinion. It asks a more fundamental question: whose mandate is it to act when international law is ignored? Respect for international law means accepting limits on power, especially when those limits are uncomfortable. It means applying legal principles equally to allies and adversaries, to powerful States and weaker States, to victims whose suffering is politically convenient and to victims whose suffering is ignored. Disrespect for international law begins when law is treated as a tool of political advantage, when legal obligations are recognized but not implemented, or when legal institutions are pressured, sanctioned or delegitimized because their work becomes inconvenient.
That is why today’s discussion on U.S. emergency powers, Article 4 of the ICCPR, sanctions, transnational repression and extraterritorial accountability is so important. Emergency powers test whether States truly accept the rule of law, or only the language of law. When sanctions are used without due process, when international courts or UN experts are targeted, when coercive measures affect people far beyond national borders, and when accountability is replaced by executive discretion, the problem is not only domestic constitutional law. It becomes a question about the future of the international legal order itself. The lesson from both BROKEN and The Mandate is simple: international law needs to be understood and is only truly accountable when implanted also from the bottom up. This is why we coined the concept: Promotion of International Law Through Film (PILF - filmforlaw.org).
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